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Abstract
In the first part of this thesis, the objective is to identify optimal bidding strategies in the
wholesale electricity market. We consider asymmetric producers submitting bids to a system
operator. The system operator allocates demand via a single clearing price auction. The
highest accepted bid sets the per unit market price payed by consumers. We find a pure Nash
equilibrium to the bidding strategies of asymmetric producers unattainable in a symmetric
model. Our results show that producers with relatively large capacities are able to exercise
market power. However, the market may seem competitive due to the large number of
producers serving demand.
The objective of the second part of the thesis, is to compare two regulation policies: a
fixed transfer price, such as tax regulation, and a permit system, such as cap-and-trade.
For this purpose, we analyze an economy where risk neutral manufacturers satisfy price
sensitive demand. The objective of the regulation established by the central planner is to
achieve an external objective, e.g. reduce pollution or limit consumption of scarce resource.
When demand is uncertain, designing these regulations to achieve the same expected level
of the external objective results in the same expected consumer price but very different
manufacturers’ expected profit and central planner revenue. For instance, our results show
that when the firms are price takers, the manufacturers with the worst technology always
prefer a tax policy. Interestingly, we identify conditions under which the manufacturers with
the cleanest technology benefit from higher expected profit as tax rate increases.
In the third part of the thesis, we investigate the impact labeling decisions have on the
supply chain. We consider a two stage supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer.
Demand is considered stochastic, decreasing in price and increasing in a quality parameter,
e.g. carbon emissions. The unit production cost for the supplier is increasing in the quality
level chosen. We identify two different contracts that maximize the efficiency of the supply
chain while allowing the different parties to achieve their objectives individually.
Thesis Supervisor: David Simchi-Levi
Title: Professor, The Engineering Systems Division
and Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The use of natural resources is part of the daily life of individuals of the modern society.
Trees, are used as paper, such as in store receipts, cups and airplane tickets, trees are also
used as furniture and fuel. Petroleum and oil, are used as fuel for vehicles, heating and fuel.
However, figures presented in the BP Statistical Review of World Energy 1 suggest that oil
would not last more than 47 years, should global production remain at the same rate.
Furthermore, the depletion of natural resources is not the only concern. Increasing
amounts of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases are constantly being released. In
fact, electricity generation and transportation account for 61% of the U.S. greenhouse gas
emissions in 20112. The concern over these gases has been such that in 1997 the united
nations established an international treaty where many developed countries agreed to legally
binding reductions in their emissions of greenhouse gases.
The depletion of natural resources and the concern over climate change have motivated
businesses and governments to use their resources in such a way as to not only meet human
needs, but also preserve the environment. The objective of sustainable operations is to be
able to continue production with little, or manageable, impact on the environment.
In the past 30 years, different initiatives have been implemented with the purpose of im-
proving sustainability. Examples of these initiatives include car manufacturers improving the
technology of their hybrid vehicles, big retailers like Walmart demanding that their suppliers
label the carbon emissions associated with their products, televisions being labeled accord-
ing to energy consumption, washing machines being labeled according to water efficiency,
increasing sales in solar panels, etc.
1Source: British Petroleum, bp.com
2Source: Environmental Protection Agency, epa.gov
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Larger scale initiatives are also being implemented, for example, governments are estab-
lishing environmental policies in order to regulate emissions to the environment. The two
most common policies are the implementation of a tax to be associated with the carbon
emissions, and an emission trading scheme where producers acquire emissions rights prior to
production and are allowed to trade these permits among each other. With the implemen-
tation of a carbon tax, fuels yielding high amount of emissions become more costly, while
fuels with low level of emissions are not affected as much. With the implementation of an
emissions trading schemes, it is possible to restrict the total amount of emissions to the
environment by limiting the amount of permits.
Implementations of these two environmental policies can be found in practice. For ex-
ample, Australia implemented a carbon tax policy in July 2012, with the intention of transi-
tioning to an emission trading scheme by 2015. An example of a successful implementation
of an emission trading scheme can be found in the New England area of the United States,
where after the implementation of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, the usage of fossil
fuels has been reduced, see Figure 1-1.
Figure 1-1: Evolution of sources of energy for the New England area after the implementation
of the RGGI. (Source: http://www.eia.gov/)
Unfortunately, not all of these initiatives have the desired effect. The initial implemen-
tation of an emission trading scheme in the European Union is largely considered a failure
by the media. Serious flaws have been detected in the design of the trading scheme. First,
permits were given free of charge to businesses, therefore, some companies were able to earn
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additional profits by trading excess permits. Second, the target emissions was larger than the
current production for many businesses and as such the permits had little effect in reducing
emissions. An auction mechanism was introduced later to mitigate these effects.
The field of operations research has been actively involved in studying different aspects
of sustainability. For example, Benjaafar et al. (2011) study the effect of integrating carbon
emission constraints into operational decision making. By modifying classic decision making
models, such as facility location problem, the authors find that firms could effectively reduce
their carbon emissions without significantly increasing their costs by making only operational
adjustments and by collaborating with other members of their supply chain. With the
growing interest in local food procurement, Ata et al. (2012), analyze the operational trade-
offs of a retailer and farmers in a fresh produce supply chain, studying mechanisms that allow
local farmers to increase their competitiveness. Regarding the use of electric vehicles, Avci
et al. (2012), provide an analysis suggesting the incorporation of stations where users are
able to quickly switch batteries, as an effective way to reduce the low battery life limitations
of electric vehicles.
In a global supply chain context, Keskin and Plambeck (2011), analyze the effect imports
from a region with no climate policy into a state with climate policy have on greenhouse
gas accounting. By considering processes that yield co-products, where only some of the
co-products are imported, the authors show that accounting for emissions on imports can in-
crease global emissions when the allocation rule for emissions generated from the co-products
is not chosen appropriately.
Motivated by the increase of wind power initiatives, Nair et al. (2012), use a news vendor
type model to analyze energy procurement strategies in the presence of renewable, intermit-
tent and unpredictable energy sources. Similarly, the subsidies given in Germany towards
solar photovoltaic technology, motivated Lobel and Perakis (2011), to develop a framework
for policy makers to find optimal subsidies in order to achieve an adoption target at minimum
cost to the system. By assuming consumers purchase solar panels according to a discrete
choice model, the authors analyze the structure of an optimal subsidy policy and use it to
analyze Germany’s current policy.
This thesis analyzes three different problems motivated by sustainability. Two of these
topics are related to the energy market, while the last topic explores the impact environmen-
tal labels have on supply chain performance. A brief description of the particular problems
is as follows.
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1.1.1 Bertrand competition over a homogeneous service
The first topic, developed in Chapter 2, is motivated by the electricity market. Traditionally,
the electric power industry acted as a vertically integrated, highly regulated monopoly. Over
the last three decades, deregulation has been introduced in the electric power market in many
countries. Interestingly, different electricity market have implemented decentralization in
different ways. For example, prior to 2001, in the England and Wales wholesale electricity
market every day generators submit bids to supply demand for electricity, and the highest
accepted bid sets the market price received by all winners. In March 2001, a reform was
implemented and the payment mechanism was changed to a pay-per-bid scheme. Much
research has been produced in comparing these two payment schemes.
In this chapter, we analyze the optimal bidding strategies in a simplified model of a whole-
sale electricity market. For this purpose, we consider asymmetric producers submitting bids
to a system operator. The system operator allocates demand based on the bids submitted
– the producer with the lowest bid will satisfy demand up to its capacity and remaining
demand is allocated to the second lowest-bid producer until its capacity is exhausted and
so-on. The highest accepted bid sets the per unit market price payed by consumers and
received by all participating producers. This is known as a uniform price payment scheme.
We find a pure Nash equilibrium to the bidding strategies of asymmetric producers. Our
results under full information show that producers with relatively large capacities are able
to exercise market power by raising per unit market price far above the perfect competition
price. However, the market may seem competitive due to the large amount of producers
serving demand.
1.1.2 Emissions Regulation: Carbon Tax and Cap-and-trade
The second topic, developed in Chapter 3, is motivated by the discussion among policy
makers regarding the best way to regulate emissions to the environment. The objective
of this chapter is to help policy makers compare two regulation policies: a fixed transfer
price, such as tax regulation, and a permit system, such as cap-and-trade. For this purpose,
we analyze an economy where risk neutral manufacturers satisfy price sensitive demand.
The focus of the regulation established by the central planner is on achieving an external
objective, e.g. reduce pollution or limit consumption of scarce resource.
We show that when demand is deterministic, and under full information, the two regula-
tion policies are equivalent: the manufacturers, central planner and consumers are indifferent
between the two policies. However, when demand is uncertain, designing these regulations
to achieve the same expected level of the external objective results in the same expected con-
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sumer price but very different manufacturers’ expected profit and central planner revenue.
For instance, our results show that when the firms are price takers, the manufacturers with
the worst technology always prefer a tax policy, while the central planner prefers a permit
policy. Interestingly, we identify conditions under which the manufacturers with the cleanest
technology benefit from higher expected profit as tax rate increases.
1.1.3 Carbon Footprint Labeling
The third topic, developed in Chapter 4 , investigates the impact the labeling decision has on
the supply chain. In particular, our research focuses on whether the information provided by
the label, e.g. energy consumption or CO2 emissions in the case of the environmental labels,
should be decided by the manufacturer or imposed by the retailer. Such a decision, like
product quality, is typically made by the manufacturer. However, retailers have more direct
contact with the consumers, and we consider the possibility of a retailer to be influential
enough such that it can suggest a quality level to the manufacturer. The manufacturer bears
the cost of quality decisions, that is the cost of reducing emissions, yet the retailer faces the
risk of uncertain demand. The question we are looking to analyze is the following:
In an environment where demand is affected by a quality measure, which party should
decide on the quality level to be labeled: the manufacturer or the retailer? What kind of
contracts are able to achieve the levels and profits of a vertically integrated supply chain?
We identify two different contracts that maximize the efficiency of the supply chain
while allowing the different parties to achieve their objectives individually. Additionally, we
compare the environmental impacts of two models: one where the retailer determines the
level of emissions the manufacturer should follow, and a second model where these decisions
are made by the manufacturer.
17
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Chapter 2
Bertrand Competition With
Capacities Over a Homogeneus
Service
2.1 Introduction
Traditionally, the electric power industry acted as a vertically integrated, highly regulated,
monopoly. Over the last three decades, with the objective of introducing competition and
improving economic efficiency, deregulation has been introduced in the electric power mar-
ket in many countries. In these deregulated markets, the schedule of power generation is
determined by market mechanisms such as auctions. Producers are asked to submit bids to
a system operator which allocates demand based on the bids submitted – the producer with
the lowest bid will satisfy demand up to its bid quantity and remaining demand is allocated
to the second lowest-bid producer until its bid quantity and so-on. The highest accepted bid
sets the per unit market price received by all participating producers. Producers identify
their optimal bids in this auction so as to maximize revenue.
Our objective in this work is to describe (pure) optimal bidding strategies for the produc-
ers, allowing us to identify possible sources of inefficiencies of this type of auction compared
with a more centralized system. We focus on sealed bid single auctions of multiple identical
items. In these auctions, all bidders are asked to simultaneously submit multiple bids to the
auctioneer, one bid for each item desired, and the highest bids wins the items.
A considerable amount of research has been focused on auction design. Important in
our research are sealed bid auctions for the sale of identical objects. Three types of auction
design are of special interest: discriminatory auction, uniform-price auction and Vickrey
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auction. In a discriminatory auction, bidders pay theirs winning bids. For example, U.S.
Treasury 2-year and 5-year notes were sold by means of a discriminatory auction prior to
1992. In a uniform-price auction, all items are sold at a single price, and his price is equal
to the lowest winning bid or the highest losing bid. For example, U.S. Treasury 2-year and
5-year notes are currently sold in uniform-price auctions. A report from the U.S. Treasury by
Archibald and Malvey (1998), summarizes empirical findings comparing the performance of
these two auction mechanisms when implemented to sell U.S. Treasury Notes. Interestingly,
the report does not show a significant advantage of one auction over the other.
Truthful bidding, the bidding of participants own valuation, is a desired property for
an auction as it discourages participants from gaming the auction. Neither of the auctions
described earlier, discriminatory or uniform-price, provide incentives for bidders to submit
their true values for the items. In Vickrey (1961), the author proposes a multiunit auction,
later known as Vickrey auction, that under the assumption of i.i.d. bidders, guarantees that
truthful bidding is a weakly dominant strategy. Despite this attractive property of Vickrey
auction, the U.S. Treasury and several electricity markets apply uniform-price auctions.
They argue that this is an attractive auction from a few points of views: revenue, efficiency,
strategic simplicity, and susceptibility to collusion, see Krishna (2009).
The literature supporting this argument is limited, for instance, Milgrom (1989), ana-
lyzed a multiunit auction where the valuations of bidders are independently drawn from the
same distribution. In his model, each bidder desires at most one unit of the good being
auctioned, finding that a sealed bid uniform-price auction yields more revenue than a sealed
bid discriminatory price auction. However, Back and Zender (1993), compare a sealed bid
uniform-price auction with a discriminatory auction, when the item is perfectly divisible and
bidders valuations are drawn from the same distribution. The authors show that results
developed under single unit demand assumption, as in Milgrom (1989), do not generalize to
auctions in which bidders desire multiple units.
The application of auction theory to electricity markets is not straightforward. There are
two characteristics in the electricity market that differ from the typical auctions framework.
First, the system operator’s objective is not necessarily the maximization of revenue. Second,
participating in the electricity market requires an immense capital investment. Therefore,
the set of market participants in each auction does not change much over time, moreover
there exists public information about the participants’ technology.
Regarding the study of auctions in the electricity market, Son et al. (2004) analyze a
two player auction game with full information. Under the assumptions of a big player with
market power (large capacity) competing against a small player to serve inelastic demand,
the authors compare the performance of uniform pricing and pay-as-bid pricing in electricity
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markets. The authors show that unlike a single item auction, the Nash equilibrium under
pay as bid pricing yields less total revenue in expectation than under uniform pricing. Hu
et al. (2010), analyze an auction with asymmetrical bidders, each with a specific linear cost
function. In their model, suppliers bid a quantity-price pair, the auctioneer collects the bids
and satisfies an inelastic demand at minimal cost. The demand allocated to a supplier is
limited by the quantity stated in their bid, and similarly to a discriminatory auction, the
price-per-unit paid to each supplier is the price stated in their bid. The authors are able to
characterize the optimal bidding strategies for suppliers in their model.
In Hu et al. (2011), the authors analyze an auction where suppliers have linear produc-
tion cost, and a fixed capacity. Suppliers independently submit a bid representing a per-unit
price to the auctioneer. The auctioneer then satisfies demand – the supplier with the lowest
bid will satisfy demand up to its capacity and remaining demand is allocated to the sec-
ond lowest-bid supplier up to capacity and so-on. The authors then compare market price
volatility when the payment scheme is uniform-price versus a pay-per-bid payment. The
authors completely characterize equilibria in a symmetric supplier setting, extending results
to account for uncertain demand. The results obtained show that a pay-per-bid payment
scheme yields lower price volatility than a uniform-price payment scheme.
In this chapter, we consider asymmetric producers bidding to serve a price sensitive de-
mand. Similar to Hu et al. (2011), each producer submits a single bid representing the
per-unit price they charge for energy, up to their capacity. The system operator collects the
bids and allocates demand as in a uniform-price auction, the price paid to each producer is
the highest accepted bid. We find an intuitive equilibrium for the optimal bidding strategies
of producers under the assumption of equal capacities. However, this strategy is not neces-
sarily optimal when producers have different capacities; modifications to the aforementioned
strategy are introduced in order to find an equilibrium.
2.2 Model
Consider n producers serving market demand for a homogeneous product, that is, customers
do not distinguish between products, say electricity, provided by different producers. Each
producer i has a linear production cost ci(q) = ciq, for delivering q units. Associated with
each producer is a capacity constraint, ki, establishing that producer i is unable to produce
more than ki units.
We consider a market demand D(p), which is a decreasing convex function of the price
paid by consumers. We assume demand to be such that pD(p) is concave. Each supplier
submits a bid pi, for the price they are willing to sell their product, but of course they
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are limited by capacity. We assume that there exists a large upper bound µ  max
i=1,...,n
{ci}
to the possible bids. The central planner then collects the bids from the suppliers. Market
equilibrium is achieved when the central planner finds the smallest price p such that demand,
which is a function of price, can be satisfied by the capacity available at that price. More
precisely, the central planner is looking for the smallest market price p such that:
n∑
i=1
kiδ(pi < p) < D(p) ≤
n∑
i=1
kiδ(pi ≤ p), (2.1)
where δ is the indicator function. Finally, the central planner assigns the portion of demand,
zi, to be satisfied by each supplier based on their bids.
• If supplier i bid is such that pi < p, then supplier i is assigned its capacity ki.
• If supplier i bid is such that pi = p, then supplier i is assigned,
ki∑
l∈E(p)
kl
(D(p)−
n∑
j=1
kjδ(pj < p)),
where E(p) is the set of suppliers that bid p.
• If supplier i bid is such that pi > p, then supplier i does not receive any allocation.
To simplify notation we introduce the following definitions. We refer to the vector of
bids ~p = (p1, ..., pn), where the ith component is the bid submitted by producer i, as a
bidding profile. Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be the set of all producers, L(p) = {i ∈ N|pi < p}
be the set of producers whose bidding prices is lower than the market price and finally let
G(p) = {i ∈ N|pi > p} be the set of producers whose bidding price is larger than the market
price, p. Of course, the following identity holds E(p) = N \ (L(p) ∪G(p)).
The objective of this study is to find an equilibrium to the suppliers bidding decisions
under full information. Interestingly, as we shall see, traditional strategies such as bidding
supplier own cost, or undercutting the lowest cost supplier, whose cost is higher than the
cost of the bidder, have deviations that prevent them from being an equilibrium.
2.3 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section we develop results allowing us to characterize producers’ optimal bidding
strategy. For this purpose, we develop four propositions. Proposition 2.3.1, begins by stating
a simple, yet useful, observation regarding the equilibrium market price for consumers. Next,
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Proposition 2.3.2, shows that considering producers with asymmetric costs greatly simplifies
the analysis. The third proposition, Proposition 2.3.3, finds optimal bidding strategies under
the assumption of equal capacities. Finally, Theorem 2.3.1, finds optimal bidding strategies
for the case where capacities are not necessarily equal.
We begin the analysis by stating a proposition that reduces the candidates for equilibrium
market price for a given bidding profile ~p = (p1, ..., pn).
Proposition 2.3.1. Let ~p = (p1, ..., pn) be a bidding profile submitted by producers. Then
the market price to consumers p is such that p ∈ {pi}ni=1.
Proof. Given the bidding profile ~p = (p1, ..., pn), there is only one value pl such that pl
satisfies (2.1). Observe that there may be multiple suppliers i bidding pl, but the value of
the bid is unique. Let’s consider a price p− = pl − ε, where ε > 0. In this situation,
n∑
i=1
kiδ(pi ≤ p−) ≤
n∑
i=1
kiδ(pi < pl) < D(pl) ≤ D(p−).
The inequalities yield,
∑n
i=1 kiδ(pi ≤ p−) < D(p−), therefore p− cannot be the equilib-
rium market price. Hence pl is the smallest price satisfying (2.1).
Proposition 2.3.1 allows us to characterize supplier’s profit in a simple expression. Given
a bidding profile ~p = (p1, ..., pn), supplier i’s profit is given by the following expression:
ui(~p) =

(pl − ci)ki i ∈ L(pl)
ki∑
r∈E(pl)
kr
(pl − ci)(D(pl)−
∑
j∈L(pl)
kj) i ∈ E(pl)
0 i ∈ G(pl)
where pl is the bid satisfying (2.1).
Next, we proceed to show that if suppliers have different costs, then there is exactly one
producer that bids pl in equilibrium, namely |E(pl)| = 1.
Proposition 2.3.2. If suppliers costs are such that c1 < c2 < ... < cn, then in equilibrium
there is exactly one supplier whose bid satisfies (2.1).
Proof. Let ~p be the equilibrium bid, pl is the bid satisfying (2.1). Let i ∈ arg min
j∈E(pl)
{cj}, the
profit for producer i is:
ui(~p) =
ki∑
r∈E(pl)
kr
(pl − ci)(D(pl)−
∑
j∈L(pl)
kj).
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Assume |E(pl)| > 1. If pl ≤ ci, then under our assumption of different costs, other suppliers
bidding pl receive negative profits. Therefore there exists a deviation for these producers
towards bidding higher, and ~p could not be an equilibrium.
To conclude the proof we consider the case pl > ci. If supplier i deviates to p˜i = pl − ε,
we distinguish between two different cases:
• ∑j∈L(pl)∪{i} kj < D(pl), in this case supplier’s i profit is given by ui(~p) = (pl − ci)ki,
meaning supplier i is better off by reducing its bid.
• ∑j∈L(pl)∪{i} kj ≥ D(pl) > ∑j∈L(pl) kj: In this case, for a small value of ε, supplier’s i
profit is given by ui(~p) = (pl − ε)(D(pl − ε) −
∑
j∈L(pl) kj). By considering a value of
ε, small enough such that,
(pl − ε− ci)(D(pl − ε)−
∑
j∈L(pl)
kj) >
ki∑
r∈E(pl)
kr
(pl − ci)(D(pl)−
∑
j∈L(pl)
kl),
or equivalently,
ε(D(pl−ε)−
∑
j∈L(pl)
kj) < (pl−ci)(D(pl−ε)−D(pl)+(1− ki∑
r∈E(pl)
kr
)(D(pl)−
∑
j∈L(pl)
kj)),
we can guarantee that supplier i has a profitable deviation. To prove the existence of
such ε, it is enough to notice that for ε = 0 the inequality is satisfied strictly, and the
elements of the inequality are continuous.
Without loss of generality we can index the producers such that c1 ≤ . . . ≤ cn. For the
remaining of the analysis we restrict ourselves to the case when the inequalities are strict,
namely c1 < . . . < cn, because as illustrated in Proposition 2.3.2, under this assumptions
there is only one producer setting the price of the auction.
In this framework, the cost revealing strategy, pi = ci, is never an equilibrium. Indeed,
let pl be the bid satisfying (2.1). For suppliers in G(pl) there are no profitable deviations,
as lowering the bid would yield negative profits. Let q be the supplier such that pl = cq,
then supplier k in L(pl)∪ {q}, has incentive for changing its bid to pk = cq + cq+1−cq2 < cq+1.
Therefore, the bidding profile where producers bid their true cost is not an equilibrium.
One may be inclined to think that the shifted cost revealing strategy, pi = ci+1, where
cn+1 = µ, and µ is the upper bound on all bids, is an equilibrium. Unfortunately, this
strategy won’t necessarily be an equilibrium, as the dependency of demand on price implies
that suppliers may not necessarily want to increase price.
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The next proposition presents an strategy that is an equilibrium when suppliers all have
the same capacity.
Proposition 2.3.3. Assume all suppliers have capacity ki = k. Let p
∗
i = arg max
p≤ci+1
{(p −
ci)(D(p)− (i− 1)k)}. Let pl be the solution of (2.1) for the bidding profile ~p = (p∗1, . . . , p∗n),
and l the supplier bidding pl. Then, the bidding profile:
pi =
{
p∗i for i ∈ N \G(pl)
ci for i ∈ G(pl)
is an equilibrium.
Proof. Given that p∗i is the result of a maximization problem over a compact set, the existence
of p∗i is guaranteed and the concavity assumption implies a unique, well-defined p
∗
i . Notice
that under the concavity assumption p∗i ≤ p∗i+1.
For suppliers in G(pl) there are no possible deviations, bidding a lower price would yield
negative profits while bidding any higher won’t increase profit.
For supplier l, given that he keeps its position as a leader, then it’s bidding optimally,
by definition. If the leader reduces its price enough to change its position, then the market-
per-unit price is set by a producer k ∈ L(pl). Therefore, the consumer price, p∗k, is such that
p∗k ≤ cl, and yields non positive profits to supplier l. If the leader increases its price enough
to change its position, then a producer in G(pl) takes its leader position and supplier l is not
allocated any demand. Therefore, supplier l has no incentive to deviate.
Let j be a supplier in L(pl), its profit won’t depend on the bidding price unless it replaces
supplier l, or a supplier in G(pl). If it substitutes a supplier in G(pl), the new profit is zero
as it would receive no allocated demand, therefore there is no incentive to deviate. If it
replaces supplier l then the problem faced by supplier j is:
max
p∗l≤p≤cl+1
{(p− cj)(D(p)− (l − 1)k)}
The solution to this optimization problem will also be p∗l . For this purpose, we analyze
two cases.
• If p∗l is such that ddp{(p− cl)(D(p)− (l− 1)k)}|p∗l = 0, i.e. interior optimum due to the
concavity assumption. Then we have that
p∗lD
′(p∗l ) +D(p
∗
l )− (l − 1)k − clD′(p∗l ) = 0
And since D(p) is non increasing, and cj ≤ cl, we have that −clD′(p∗l ) ≥ −cjD′(p∗l ).
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Hence:
p∗lD
′(p∗l ) +D(p
∗
l )− (l − 1)k − cjD′(p∗l ) ≤ p∗lD′(p∗l ) +D(p∗l )− (l − 1)k − clD′(p∗l ) = 0
Therefore by raising the price over p∗l the payoff of the jth player decreases, and due
to the concavity, the optimal strategy for this player is pj = p
∗
l .
• If p∗l is such that ddp{(p − cl)(D(p) − (l − 1)k)}|p∗l > 0, i.e. p∗l = cl+1. Then the space
of the feasible solutions for the strategies of j is the singleton {p∗l }.
Therefore supplier j receives the same price, but a smaller allocation of demand. And hence
supplier j has no incentive to deviate.
When suppliers do not necessarily have the same capacities, some non intuitive deviations
can occur. For example, consider the case of four suppliers with the following characteristics:
• Costs: c1 = 1, c2 = 2.45, c3 = 2.5 and c4 = 4.
• Capacities: k1 = 10, k2 = 2, k3 = 1 and k4 = 1.
• Demand: D(p) = 16− p
The strategy presented in Proposition 2.3.3, ~p = (2, 2.5, 3.25, 4), yields profits of $22.5
for producer 1 which is allocated 10 units of demand, profits of $1.6 for producer 2 which is
allocated 2 units of demand, profits of $0.5625 to producer 3 which is allocated 0.75 units
of demand, and producer 4 is not allocated any demand. However, producer 1 may increase
his profit by bidding a higher price, in exchange for serving less demand. Indeed, a bidding
profile ~p = (6.5, 2.5, 3.25, 4) yields profits of $30.25 for producer 1, and a demand allocation
of 6 units of demand. This deviation increases profits for producers 2, 3 and 4 to $8.1, $4
and $2.5, respectively. This sort of deviation involves giving up a portion of demand in
exchange for the opportunity to increase consumer price. This deviation is only profitable
for producers that have relatively large capacity.
To analyze the general case, where producers have different capacities, let b0 = (b01, . . . , b
0
n),
defined as:
b0i =
{
p∗i for i ∈ N \G(pl)
ci for G(pl)
where pl is defined by Equation (2.1) and the bidding profile b
0, and l is the producer such
that b0l = pl. Producer i’s profit under this allocation is:
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ui(b
0) =

(pl − ci)ki for i ∈ L(pl)
(pl − cl)(D(pl)−
∑
j∈L(pl)
kj) for i = l
0 for i ∈ G(pl)
Let S the set of providers who can make a profitable unilateral deviation from the bidding
profile b0. Note that S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , l}, since for the providers i > l offering a lower price will
yield negative profit as the price they would be paid would be less than or equal to cl+1. If
S = ∅ then b0 would be an equilibrium, since no player has a profitable deviation. Consider
the case S 6= ∅. Unfortunately, in this case b0 is not an equilibrium, however, we can modify
it to become one.
Theorem 2.3.1. Assume S 6= ∅. Denote l the producer whose bid satisfies (2.1) for the
bidding profile b0. Given i ∈ S, denote:
pji = arg max
b0j≤p≤cl+j+1
{(p− ci)(D(p)−
∑
v=1:l+j
v 6=i
kv)}
Consider:
σ(i) ∈ arg max (pji − ci)(D(pji )−
∑
v=1:l+j
v 6=i
kv)
s.t. j ∈ S(i) = {j|D(pji ) >
∑
v=1:l+j
v 6=i
kv}
Let τ ∈ arg maxi∈S{pσ(i)i }. The bidding profile bτ = (bτ1, . . . , bτn), defined by
bτi =

p∗i , for i ≤ l, i 6= τ
p
σ(τ)
τ , for i = τ
ci, for i > l,
is an equilibrium.
Observe that pji in the statement of Theorem 2.3.1, is the optimal bid for producer i
if it becomes leader by bidding over supplier j. Similarly, S(i) is the set of suppliers such
that supplier i can bid over them and still have allocated demand . In addition, supplier i
maximum profit from a deviation, is obtained by bidding over supplier σ(i). Finally, τ is
the producer, among those with profitable deviations, whose most profitable deviation yields
the highest price to the consumer, and therefore, the highest per-unit price for all producers.
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Theorem 2.3.1 states that such deviation is an equilibrium.
Proof. Given that S 6= ∅, and ∀i ∈ S, S(i) 6= ∅, then there exists a solution σ(i) for all i ∈ S.
Hence, there exists a τ ∈ arg maxi∈S{σ(i)}.
Notice that σ(τ) > l ≥ τ , as producer τ is taking the position of leader. Therefore,
producer τ ’s bid defines the per-unit price that is paid to providers j = 1, . . . , σ(τ). Observe
that bτ is different from the previous profile only on the component τ . To check that the
bidding profile bτ is an equilibrium, we analyze profitable deviations for supplier i:
• If i = τ , given that σ(τ) is chosen as
arg max{(pjτ − cτ )(D −
∑
v=1:l+j
v 6=τ
kv)|j ∈ S(τ)},
by definition, provider τ cannot do better by deviating from the profile bτ .
• If i ≥ σ(τ) + 1, then supplier i won’t be better of by changing its bid, as then it would
get negative profit since p
σ(τ)
τ ≤ cσ(τ)+1.
• If l < i ≤ σ(τ), then given the definition of l, we have that∑l−1j=1 kj < D(p∗l ) ≤∑lj=1 kj.
Given that demand is decreasing, we have that if supplier i bids above producer τ , no
demand is allocated to it. If supplier i bids any lower than p
σ(τ)
τ , supplier’s i profit is
not changed. Therefore, there is no incentive to deviate.
• If i ≤ l and i 6= τ , supplier i gets allocated its full capacity ki. To achieve a higher
profit provider i has to bid higher than provider τ otherwise the price does not change,
and therefore if it were allocated any demand it would be a fraction of its capacity. If
that were to be the case, the profit cannot be higher than the most profitable unilateral
deviation for i, the one obtained by bidding p
σ(i)
i . To see this, denote v(i) the profit
that supplier i obtains when deviating to p
σ(i)
i . Given the choice of τ , then p
σ(i)
i ≤ pσ(τ)τ ,
and therefore (p
σ(i)
i − ci)ki ≤ (pσ(τ)τ − ci)ki. Hence v(i) ≤ (pσ(τ)τ − ci)ki. Therefore i has
no incentive to deviate.
Revisiting the example presented prior to Theorem 2.3.1, it was shown that the allocation
~p = (2, 2.5, 3.25, 4) had a profitable deviation for producer 1. In fact, the set of producers
with a profitable deviation is S = {1, 2}, as a deviation to ~p = (2, 3.725, 3.25, 4) increases
profits for producer 2. In this example, producer 1 is able to bid over producers 2, 3 and 4
and still be allocated demand, therefore S(1) = {2, 3, 4}. If producer 1 decides to take the
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position of producer 2, 3 or 4, then the optimal bidding price for producer 1 is p21 = $2.5,
p31 = $4 or p
4
1 = $6.5 respectively. By computing the profits, it is easy to see that producer
1 benefits the most from bidding above producer 4, therefore σ(1) = 4, and p
σ(1)
1 = $6.5.
In the example, producer 2 can only benefit from bidding above producer 3, therefore,
S(2) = {3}. The optimal bid for producer 2, if it becomes leader, is p32 = $3.725. Finally, as
there is only one candidate, σ(2) = 3, and p
σ(2)
2 = $3.725.
The largest p
σ(i)
i corresponds to producer 1, therefore, Theorem 2.3.1 states that the
bidding profile b1 = (6.5, 2.5, 3.25, 4) is an equilibrium.
Theorem 2.3.1, constructs an equilibrium when producers have different capacities, and
the strategy from Proposition 2.3.3 fails to be an equilibrium. The intuition behind the
strategy is that a producer that may benefit from letting other producers undercut him, will
do so, reaching a point where profit is maximized. Interestingly, this strategy increases the
number of suppliers serving market demand, as well as the price to the consumer.
2.4 Conclusions
The objective of this work is to identify producers’ optimal bidding strategies in a market
where a system operator allocates demand based on price-per-unit submitted – the lowest
price provider will satisfy demand up to its capacity and remaining demand is allocated
to the second low-price provider until its capacity is exhausted and so-on. The price-per-
unit paid to each of the suppliers is the same, and equal to the largest price bid placed by
an assigned supplier. Under a full information framework, we are able to characterize the
optimal bidding strategies for producers. This framework is appropriate for situations where
producers repeat multiple times the auction process. For example in the electricity market,
auctions are repeated periodically, and given the high capital requirements, the set of market
participants does not change much from auction to auction.
Under the assumption of equal capacities the optimal bidding strategy for a producer
is intuitive. Each producer will bid the price that maximizes his/her profit, under the
constraint that the producer won’t be undercut by a producer with a higher cost. This
strategy guarantees that if the producer sets the price, then he/she is receiving optimal
profits, alternatively if the producer is not setting the price, there is no incentive to change
the bid. A direct implication of this strategy is that producers will receive profits by biding
above their marginal cost, this is in contrast with the case of a regulated market. However,
the profit per unit is limited, as a high bid will be undercut by producers willing to satisfy
demand. Observe that due to the nature of the pricing mechanism, there exists multiple
equilibria that achieve the same consumer price and allocation of demand.
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When the equal capacity assumption is removed, interesting deviations show up. Pro-
ducers with large capacities are able to exercise market power. By letting other producers
undercut them, producers with large capacities are able to raise their bid to further increase
profits. This exercise of market power is particularly interesting as it increases the number
of producers participating in the market, yet the market is not behaving as a competitive
market. Moreover, given that the deviation increases profits for all producers, it may be
confused with collusion.
30
Chapter 3
Emissions Regulation In The
Electricity Market
3.1 Introduction
Businesses often face regulations imposed by governments or business partners when making
production decisions. These regulations are set in order to achieve some external objectives,
for example reduce pollution or limit consumption of a scarce resource such as water. Con-
trolling the external objective can be achieved in different ways, for instance through price
penalties, i.e., taxation (see Pigou (1920)), or by permit regulation, that is, the enforcement
of a quota associated with the external objective through permits (see Coase (1960)). Thus,
by changing the ”rules of the game,” governments or business partners let players optimize
their profit, and at the same time achieve the external objective (see Mas-Colell and Green
(1995)).
Our objective in this chapter is to address the following question. In an environment
where the production process delivers an undesirable effect, such as waste or overuse of a
scarce resource, which is the better way to regulate production in a decentralized fashion:
incorporate a fixed penalty similar to a tax, or require manufacturers to purchase permits
that limit the amount of the undesired effect?
Specifically, we are trying to identify conditions under which one approach is preferable to
the other, from various points of views: manufacturers, consumers and the central planner.
For this purpose, consider a model with a number of producers that compete in the market by
delivering the same kind of product or service, albeit may use different technologies. Given
a market price, each producer determines the amount she is willing to produce by solving an
optimization problem associated with revenue and costs. This optimization problem defines
31
the producer’s supply function which is the capacity she is willing to provide the market as
a function of market price for the finished product.
We assume that customer demand is linear with price. For each manufacturer the level
of externality, for example, emission level, is linear with the amount produced, while man-
ufacturing cost is quadratic with this amount. Such quadratic cost functions are known to
well approximate supply chain costs (Samuelson (1970)).
To establish the market price paid by consumers, as well as the quantities that each
producer delivers to the market, we search for the market equilibrium. This equilibrium
is achieved at the point of agreement between the demand function and aggregated supply
function, aggregated across all manufacturers. When the aggregate supply and demand
agree, the market price and quantities produced are determined. This is the common theme
that we apply, putting emphasis on how regulation affect the market’s equilibrium price,
manufacturers profits and the external objective.
We consider two types of regulations to be imposed in this market: tax regulation and
permit regulation. In tax regulation we impose a monetary penalty proportional to the
amount of the undesired product. By contrast, in permit regulation we allow manufacturers
to purchase permits that limit the amount of waste produced, or the use of scarce resource.
We consider three different types of permit regulations: (i) cap regulation, where manufac-
turers have an ability to purchase permits; (ii) cap-and-buyback, where manufacturers have
an ability to purchase permits and sell surplus permits back to the central planner at the
end of the horizon; and (iii) cap-and-trade, where manufacturers have an ability to purchase
permits as well as trade permits with other manufacturers. Our objective is to compare the
performance of each of these permit mechanisms.
Our starting point is to determine how regulations perform in a setting where producers
can anticipate customer demand, i.e., in a deterministic setting. We show, in tax regulation,
the existence of a price penalty that allows the central planner to achieve the desired external
objective. Since in permit regulations, manufacturers will purchase exactly the permits they
need, the three versions of permits regulations are all equivalent. More importantly, we show
that under deterministic setting the two regulation policies, tax and permit regulations, are
equivalent from manufacturers, consumers and the central planner points-of-views. That is,
whatever is achieved in the tax regulation can also be achieved under the permit regulation
and hence from this model point of view, it is not possible to recommend one regulation
policy over the other.
However, under stochastic demand the situation is different and more challenging. First,
in tax regulation, the central planner needs to identify the tax level that achieves the external
objective on expectation. This is a challenge since demand uncertainty affects market price
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and thus it affects production decisions. Second, in permit regulation, and unlike the de-
terministic counterpart, producers purchase permits before observing demand but may not
use all their permits. This implies that the three permit regulations, cap, cap-and-buyback
and cap-and-trade, yield different performance measures. To evaluate the four strategies,
we analyze the impact of a given tax rate or permit price on expected externality level,
expected price faced by consumers, expected revenue collected by the central planner and
manufacturers profits.
We consider two types of competition between manufacturers. In the first one, we focus
on price taking firms, that is, manufacturers that do not consider the effect of their supply
functions on market price, while in the second one we focus on those that take into account
the effect their supply functions have on market price. These types of competition have
been analyzed extensively in the literature, see Section 3.1.1. In the price taking firms case,
we explore the difference between tax regulation and permit regulations such as cap and
cap-and-buyback. In the price making case, we directly compare tax and cap-and-trade
regulations.
Surprisingly, we show that under the stochastic model, selling permits to control the
external objective is identical to finding an appropriate tax level in terms of expected exter-
nality level and expected price to the consumer. This implies that from the consumer price
and external objective points of view there is no difference between tax regulation and the
three permit regulations discussed earlier.
Manufacturers preference of regulations depends on their technology and cost structure.
Interestingly, under tax regulation, manufacturers with the cleanest technology are able to
increase expected profit as taxation rate increases, while producers with the worst technology
(e.g., high emission rate) always prefer tax regulation over cap or cap-and-buyback. By
contrast, the central planner expected revenue is always higher under cap and cap-and-
buyback than under taxation.
This analysis is motivated by discussions among policy makers, industry executives and
economists regarding effective regulations to reduce carbon emission. Some governments are
increasingly taking unilateral legislative steps to enforce compliance, Simchi-Levi (2010). For
example, on July 1st, 2012, Australia introduced a fixed price carbon tax policy, transitioning
to a cap-and-trade emission trading system on July 1st, 2015, see Future (2012). This
suggests that at least some governments prefer permit over tax regulation. The academic
community has focused on various regulation policies in the last four decades, with a large
portion of the research being conducted after the implementation of the Kyoto protocol. We
provide a brief review of this and related research in the next section.
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3.1.1 Literature Review
Our research is directly related to the seminal work by Weitzman (1974) who answered the
following question: Given that an organization wants to control a specific outcome, should
they administer the activity by specifying a production level, or just fix transfer prices and
rely on self-interested profit or utility maximization to achieve the same objective. Weitz-
man’s starting point is that while under some conditions these mechanisms are theoretically
equivalent, organizations and economists seem to favor one over the other. He first devel-
oped a model that shows that in the absence of uncertainty there is no difference between
the two planning instruments. But, if there is uncertainty in the benefits or the costs, then
it is possible to estimate the difference of the expected benefits minus cost between the two
approaches and therefore decide which one is more appropriate.
Weitzman’s approach is different than our approach in at least two ways. First, we model
competition between manufacturers while Weitzman model a single organization. Second,
the central planner in our model controls tax rate or initial permit price but not production
quantities or market price, while the central planner in Weitzman’s model control market
price or quantity produced by the organization. Thus, our perspective is different from
Weitzman’s, as we are interested in operational implications of the regulation policy, for the
producers, the central planner and consumers, as opposed to a single performance measure
(expected benefit minus cost), as in Weitzman.
The work of Weitzman motivated significant follow up research; a review can be found
in Hepburn (2006). Most notably, regarding green house gas emissions, Pizer (1997) builds
on Weitzman’s research, and uses a global integrated climate economy model to simulate
different scenarios at the macroeconomic level. Pizer estimates the net welfare gains of
alternative tax and permit policies for different values of tax and cap levels. He then compares
the optimal tax instrument with the optimal permit policy, finding that a tax policy generates
greater social welfare. Pizer’s result is influenced by the fact that permits are allocated at
no cost to the manufacturers, generating additional profit for the producers at expense of
the consumers.
More recently, Carmona et al. (2010) introduced a model where manufacturers have an
initial allocation of permits and produce goods to satisfy inelastic customer demand. Trading
of permits enables firms to increase production level or generate revenue by selling permits
to others. They show the existence of market equilibrium that specifies permit trading
price as well as the presence of windfall profit, a phenomena observed in practice after the
implementation of the Kyoto protocol. Our approach is different than their approach because
in our model demand is elastic and market price for goods is determined by demand and
supply.
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Design of an effective permit regulation has also attracted some attention. For instance,
Zhao et al. (2010) study the effect that different permit allowance allocation systems have
on the long run market equilibrium. By solving nonlinear complementarity problems, the
authors study whether permits should be purchased from their regulators, grandfathered
in fixed amounts free of charge based on past (emission) performance, or based on current
output, investments or other decisions.
Carbon emission constraints have also been studied in the area of operations management
with regards to procurement, production and inventory management. Benjaafar et al. (2011),
study how emission control policies affect the cost and emissions in traditional inventory
models, as well as the impact of collaboration among firms within the same supply chain.
The authors investigate how operational decisions can work as an alternative to investments
in technology.
Models representing supply function competition have been introduced and extensively
analyzed in the literature. The use of supply functions allow producers to adapt better to
an uncertain environment. In this model, we distinguish between two settings: price taking
firms settings and price making firms settings.
In the price making firms setting, we follow the ideas presented by Klemperer and Meyer
(1989), where an oligopoly faces uncertain demand and each firm chooses as its strategy a
supply function, a function mapping market price to production, given the supply functions
of the other producers. Under uncertain demand, the authors prove the existence of a
Nash equilibrium for the supply functions in a symmetric oligopoly, i.e., a model where all
producers have the same cost function, and provide sufficient conditions for its uniqueness.
Additionally, the authors show that the steeper the equilibrium supply functions, the more
closely competition resembles the Cournot competition model; by contrast, the flatter the
equilibrium supply functions, the closer the competition is to a Bertrand competition model.
By contrast, in our price taking model, producers submit a supply function by maxi-
mizing profits given a fixed market price. This choice of supply functions have been used
in the literature. For example, Dixon (1992) proposes a modification and generalization
of Edgeworth’s price setting duopoly model, which yields the competitive outcome as the
only possible equilibrium. In his paper, the model provides an account of price-setting firms
behaving as if they were price-taking firms, and setting the competitive price. The supply
function resulting from his model is the same as the one used in our price taking firms setting.
For additional examples see Maskin (1986) or Klemperer and Meyer (1989).
Supply functions approximate well the electricity market. Green (2007) uses a supply
function model to predict electricity producers’ profits, given input costs and the level of
demand. The author argues, similarly to Green and Newbery (1992), that supply function
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equilibrium is a close approximation to the mechanism of an electricity auction. Green then
compares the effect an emission trading scheme and a carbon tax policy would have in the
United Kingdom electricity market. For this purpose, the prices of gas, coal, and oil were
modeled as stochastic random variables with means equal to the Department of Trade and
Industry’s central predictions for 2020. In the model runs for the emission trading scheme,
the price of carbon is set to vary randomly around the level that would equalize the cost
of electricity generation from a coal-fired and a gas-fired station. Green argues that a price
of carbon will vary around that level, as it keeps plants of both types, coal and gas, on the
margin. By estimating an appropriate price per tone of carbon dioxide, the author uses a
carbon tax of £20.18 per tonne. Green concludes, empirically, that carbon tax reduces the
volatility faced by nuclear generators, but raises the volatility faced by fossil fuel stations,
and consequently optimal portfolios would contain a higher proportion of nuclear energy if
a carbon tax was adopted.
Finally, much like Baldick et al. (2004), we focus on an electricity market with a linear
demand function and producers with quadratic costs. Interestingly, Baldick et al. (2004)
show that a supply function equilibrium model, that is, a model involving price making
firms, approximates the England and Wales electricity market better than previous models.
3.2 Model setting
Consider n producers serving a market demand for an homogeneous good. Each producer,
i, has a strictly quadratic cost of production, ci(q) =
1
2
aiq
2 for delivering q units. Associated
with each producer is a technology parameter ti, which is the rate at which an undesired
effect, for example carbon dioxide emissions, is produced. In our model, technology has a
linear effect on the externality produced, that is, producer i will have an impact of tiq when
producing q units.
In our deterministic setting, we consider a linear demand, D(p) = B − Ap, which is a
decreasing function of the price paid by consumers. Each supplier submits a supply function
si to the central planner, which determines the amount of demand the producer is willing
to satisfy at a given price. That is, given a market price p, supplier i is willing to provide
si(p). Market equilibrium is achieved when demand, which is a function of price, equals
the aggregate supply at that price, defining the price faced by consumers. More precisely,
market price is defined by the equation:
n∑
i=1
si(p) = D(p).
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In the model under uncertainty, we consider demand, D(p, θ) = B − Ap + θ, to depend
on an additive noise, θ, representing an uncertain market size. We assume θ to have a
lower bound, meaning θ ∈ [θ0,+∞) almost surely. In this setting, each producer submits a
supply function before demand is realized. Price is determined after demand is realized by
equalizing the aggregate supply function with realized demand. More precisely, for a given
realization of the random variable θ, and the aggregate supply function
n∑
i=1
si(p), the realized
equilibrium price p(θ) is such that:
n∑
i=1
si(p(θ)) = D(p(θ), θ). (3.1)
The concept of market equilibrium that is applied in both settings, deterministic and
stochastic demand, can be stated as follows,
Definition 3.2.1. Consider n producers, each producer i with cost function ci(·), technology
ti, and a (stochastic) demand function D. A market supply function equilibrium price p
∗ is
a price such that:
• At price p∗, (realized) demand is equal to the aggregate supply of producers for a price
p∗.
• The supply function si(p) maximizes the (expected) profit of producer i.
We consider two different models representing the way suppliers determine their supply
functions: price taking settings and price making settings. In the price taking setting,
suppliers maximize their respective profits considering a fixed market price, thus, in this case
producers do not take into account the effect their submitted supply function has on changing
market price. By contrast, in the price making setting, suppliers strategize over their supply
functions, taking into account the effect their supply functions, and other producers supply
functions, have on market price.
Following Arrow (1986) we identify two aspects in which a price taking model is beneficial.
First, computing a manufacturer’s supply function requires only knowledge of its own cost,
not information about the supply functions of other producers. Second, under this setting we
are able to characterize the supply functions, and hence the optimal decisions for asymmetric
firms with minimal assumptions on the random noise. This setting is appropriate when all
manufacturers represent small electricity producers.
The advantage of considering price making producers is of course the ability to capture
market power. Indeed, some electricity markets feature a small number of producers supply-
ing the majority of electricity. In these markets, where producers decisions have a noticeable
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effect on market price, a model that captures market power, that is a price making model, is
appropriate. The challenge in this setting is that each producer strategy depends on other
producers behaviors, and in order to obtain analytical solutions, more restrictive assump-
tions are needed, in particular regarding the random noise. Moreover, under deterministic
demand there is no uniqueness of equilibria, see Klemperer and Meyer (1989).
Two methods for regulation are considered: tax regulation and permit regulation. In tax
regulation, the central planner announces a tax rate ξ per unit of externality produced. To
illustrate, producers total cost of delivering q units in this setting would be: ci(q) + ξtiq.
Producers then decide on their supply function and submit it to the central planner. The
central planner then collects the supply functions of producers and balances (realized) market
demand, finding an equilibrium price.
In permit regulation, the central planner announces a permit price pi that allows suppliers
to generate units of the externality. Prior to satisfying demand, suppliers are required to
purchase permits in order to participate in the market. To illustrate, if supplier i purchases
xi permits, then the cost of delivering q units in that period is: ci(q) + pixi, and q is limited
to no more than xi
ti
units. We consider three different types of permit regulation policies,
depending on the role of permits after they are purchased:
• Cap regulation: Permits can only be used by the producer that purchased them, and
have no value at the end of the period.
• Cap-and-buyback: Permits can only be used by the producer that purchased them.
Additionally, the central planner announces a buyback price for the permits, producers
can sell surplus permits back to the central planner at the end of the period.
• Cap-and-trade: Permits can be traded among producers after seeing realized de-
mand, but prior to serving demand, and have no value at the end of the period.
In this study, we aim to compare the effects of tax regulation and cap-and-trade regula-
tion, the most popular emission trading system implemented in practice. In a cap-and-trade
regulation, we can distinguish two features that affect producers decisions: an investment
in permits prior to production, and a market where permits are traded. In our analysis of
permits regulations, we start by isolating the effect of investment in permits, i.e. cap regu-
lation, in a price taking setting, as a stepping stone to understand cap-and-trade. Then we
introduce cap-and-buyback as a bridge between cap regulation and tax regulation. Finally,
we compare cap-and-trade and carbon tax in a price making setting.
Observe that in the cap-and-buyback regulation policy, the buyback price plays an im-
portant role. As this price increases, suppliers risk of buying too many permits, decreases,
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and hence they are willing to purchase more and more permits. This implies that for high
buyback price, producers are not limited by permits and hence, in this case, this model
acts like a tax regulation model. Of course, when the buyback price is zero, the model is
equivalent to the cap policy. Thus, cap-and-buyback is a model that includes tax policy and
cap policy as two special cases.
Throughout the analysis we assume the tax rate is small enough so that producers par-
ticipate in the market almost surely. Similarly, the permit price is not too high to prevent
producers from purchasing at least some permits. This assumption can be satisfied by im-
posing conditions to the lower bound of the noise, θ0. The assumption mainly states that
the regulation is not strict enough to exclude suppliers from the market and is required in
order to obtain results that, as we shall see in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, do not depend on the
distribution of the noise.
3.3 Price Taking Firms
We start by considering the case of price taking firms. In this setting, firms do not take
into account the effect their submitted supply functions have on changing market price. To
illustrate, consider the case where no regulation is imposed. When finding the optimal value
for the supply function given a market price of p, producer i solves the following concave
optimization problem:
si(p) ∈ arg max
q≥0
{pq − ci(q)}. (3.2)
In the price taking firms setting, the first order conditions to the problem, used to determine
the optimal value for the supply function for price p, are defined by:
p− c′i(si(p)) = 0.
There are two frameworks to be considered: deterministic demand and stochastic de-
mand. This section starts by first stating the results obtained under deterministic demand,
afterwards results for stochastic demand are developed illustrating the differences between
these two settings.
3.3.1 Deterministic demand framework
In the absence of regulation, the existence and uniqueness of a market equilibrium price are
guaranteed for price taking producers facing a deterministic demand. This holds true even
for a more general set of assumptions, see Appendix 3.D.
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Under tax regulation, the monetary penalty affects production costs and hence limits the
level of externality. By contrast, in permit regulations, once permits are acquired, they serve
as a hard constraint on the level of externality. Theorem 3.3.1 summarizes our results for
deterministic model.
Theorem 3.3.1. Given a target externality level X identified by the central planner, the
following propositions hold:
1. Let si(p) be the optimal supply function for producer i in the absence of regulation.
Under tax regulation with a tax rate ξ, the new optimal supply function for producer i
is si(p− tiξ). The larger the tax rate, the higher the market equilibrium price.
2. If X <
n∑
i=1
tiqi, where qi is the production level of producer i in the absence of regulation.
Then there exists a tax ξ > 0 such that the new market equilibrium under tax regulation
achieves X. The larger target externality level, the smaller the tax rate required.
3. The central planner can achieve a target externality level, X, under a permit regulation,
by setting the permit price to pi equal to the tax rate that achieves the same target, ξ.
In addition, the following is true:
• The permits purchased by producer i are tiqti , where qti are the production quantities
in market equilibrium under tax regulation.
• Producers consume all of the purchased permits.
• The consumer price under permit regulation is the same as the consumer price
resulting from a tax regulation with a tax rate ξ.
Theorem 3.3.1 is proven in Appendix 3.A where we show that the results hold under
strictly convex cost functions.
The first property illustrates the effect tax regulation has on the supply function submit-
ted by producers. In order to determine the optimal supply function for a specific producer,
it’s enough to shift the supply function under no regulation, and the magnitude of the shift
depends on producer’s technology. This property guarantees that properties of the original
supply functions (e.g. convexity, monotonicity or linearity) are not affected by the tax rate.
It also presents a first indication of how asymmetry in technology affects producers when
regulations are in place. The first property also indicates that market (consumer) price
increases with the tax level, but the property is silent about producers profit. Indeed, the
effect of tax on producer’s profit can not be established in general, as it depends, not only
on consumer price but also on the technology and cost of structure of each producer.
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The second property indicates that the target externality level can be achieved with a
tax policy.
Finally, the third property suggests that in order to achieve the central planner’s external
objective, tax regulation or permit regulation can be implemented. Moreover, both regu-
lations achieve the same consumer price, quantities produced, penalty paid and producer
profit. This equivalence is a consequence of the ability of producers to perfectly anticipate
demand, and purchase the exact amount of permits required, a characteristic that is valid
in a deterministic setting.
The equivalence between tax regulation and cap-and-trade policy under deterministic
setting motivates an analysis of a stochastic demand model, where producers are forced to
make an investment in permits prior to the realization of demand, and therefore we can
expect to see a difference between permit regulations and tax regulation.
3.3.2 Stochastic demand framework
In this section we compare the impact of tax and permit regulations on market equilibrium
under uncertain demand. For this purpose, we develop four propositions. Proposition 3.3.1
analyzes how a particular tax rate ξ affects the market under tax regulation. Next, Propo-
sition 3.3.2 analyzes the effect a permit price pi has on the market under a cap regulation.
The third proposition, Theorem 3.3.2, examines how the two policies, cap regulation and tax
policy, compare to each other. Specifically, given a tax and a permit price that induce the
same target expected externality level, we analyze the effect these two policies on expected
market price, expected manufacturer profit as a function of manufacturer’s cost and tech-
nology, and the central planner revenue. The final proposition of this section, Proposition
3.3.3, analyzes the effects of offering producers a buyback price for unused permits, the so
called cap-and-buyback regulation.
Given uncertain demand, and using the assumptions stated in Section 3.2, one can estab-
lish the following expressions for the relevant performance measures under a tax regulation:
Proposition 3.3.1 (Tax Regulation). Consider a tax regulation under stochastic demand.
Let ξ be the tax price. Then:
• The realized price to the consumer, p(θ), is a linear function of the uncertainty, θ.
• The expected price to the consumer is: E[p] = B+ξ
∑n
i=1
ti
ai
A+
∑n
i=1
1
ai
.
• The expected externality level is: E[e] =
∑n
i=1
ti
ai
(B+ξ(
∑n
j=1
tj−ti
aj
−tiA))
(A+
∑n
i=1
1
ai
)
.
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• The expected profit for producer i is: E[Πi] = 12aiE[(p(θ)− ξti)2].
• Producer’s i expected profit is increasing in ξ if and only if: ∑nj=1 tj−tiaj > tiA.
• The expected revenue collected by the central planner is a concave function of ξ.
The first property of the theorem is key in order to obtain expressions for expected
price and expected externality level that are independent of the distribution of the noise, θ.
The next three properties establish analytical expressions that we shall use to compare tax
regulation and cap regulation. The last two properties are surprising and thus require more
discussion.
The first among these two properties, implies that some producers can face increasing
profits as the tax rate increases. This is explained by the fact that as the tax rate in-
creases, consumer price increases, and therefore manufacturer’s revenues may increase. If
the increase in revenues dominates the manufacturer’s increase in cost, then a producer
may experience increasing profits with higher tax rates. The conditions identified in this
property,
∑n
j=1
tj−ti
aj
> tiA, implies that if any manufacturer is going to face an increase in
profit, it is the producer with the cleanest technology. In addition, an immediate corollary of
this expression is that not all producers receive increasing profits, as the producer with the
highest amount of emissions per unit produced is never going to face an increase in revenue
as the tax rate increases.
The last property of Proposition 3.3.1 suggests that increasing tax price does not always
lead to higher revenue for the central planner in exchange to lower profits for producers.
Indeed, concavity in the central planner revenue can lead to situations where increasing
the tax beyond a certain level lowers expected profits for both, manufacturers and central
planner. This phenomenon motivates the idea that subsidies by the central planner can be
potentially more beneficial than increasing tax rates in certain circumstances. We discuss
this property further in our concluding remarks.
Having stated the main result for tax regulation, what follows are similar results for
permit regulations. We begin by developing a similar proposition for cap regulation.
Proposition 3.3.2 (Cap Regulation). Consider a cap regulation and uncertain demand. Let
pi be the permit price, then:
• Let p be the realized consumer price and δ be the indicator function. Then the optimal
amount of permits purchased by producer i is xi =
tip(θi)
ai
, where θi satisfies:
E[(p(θ)− p(θi))δ(θ > θi)] = piti. (3.3)
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• The total amount of permits purchased,
n∑
i=1
xi, is decreasing on the permit price, pi.
• The realized price to the consumer, p(θ), is a convex piecewise linear function of the
uncertainty, θ.
• The expected price to the consumer is E[p] = B+pi
∑n
i=1
ti
ai
A+
∑n
i=1
1
ai
.
• The expected externality level is: E[e] =
∑n
i=1
ti
ai
(B+pi(
∑n
j=1
tj−ti
aj
−tiA))
(A+
∑n
i=1
1
ai
)
.
• The expected profit for producer i is: E[Πi] = 12aiE[min{p(θ), p(θi)}2].
• The revenue for the central planner is: R = ∑ni=1 tipiai p(θi).
The first property of Proposition 3.3.2 suggests a way to transform the cap regulation
model from optimizing on xi to characterizing the smallest value of the uncertainty, θ, such
that producer i reaches its cap. This transformation enables the characterization of various
performance measures including expected market price, expected externality level, expected
producer’s profit and the central planner revenue.
In order to compare the policies, tax policy and cap regulation, we apply the following
approach. Given a tax, that induces the same level of expected externality level as an
appropriate permit price, we characterize the difference between the performance measures
induced by each policy including expected market price, expected manufacturer profit and
(expected) central planner revenue. This is done in the next theorem.
Theorem 3.3.2. Consider a tax regulation with tax rate ξ, and a cap regulation with permit
price pi that achieve the same expected externality level under their respective regulations.
We have,
• The tax rate has to be equal to the permit price.
• The expected price to the consumer is the same under both regulations.
• Revenue for the central planner is greater under cap regulation.
• The difference between cap regulation profits and tax regulation profits for producer i
is given by:
∆i =
1
2ai
{V (min{p(θ), p(θi)})− V (θ)
(A+
n∑
i=1
1
ai
)2
},
where p denotes the consumer price in permit regulation, and V the variance of a
random variable.
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• Let i be a producer such that ti = max
j=1,..,n
{tj}. We have that for producer i,
∆i ≤ 0.
Moreover, in the case of symmetric producers (producers with similar costs and tech-
nologies), ∆k ≤ 0 ∀k.
The theorem states that in order to achieve the same impact on expected externality
level, it is sufficient to equalize the tax rate and the permit price (per unit of emission). We
provide some intuition explaining this surprising result in Appendix 3.E.
Figures 3-1 and 3-3 illustrate the power of the theorem through numerical examples with
two producers, see details in Appendix 3.B, where the x-coordinate always represents the
tax level / permit price. That is, in this numerical examples we make sure that expected
impact on the environment is the same under both regulations.
For example, in Figure 3-1 we observe the difference between the expected revenue col-
lected under tax regulation (presented as blue x) and the revenue collected under cap regu-
lation (presented as green circles) as we increase the tax/ permit price. We see that revenue
collected from a cap regulation dominates the expected revenue collected from the tax policy
for every tax/permit price. Concavity of the revenue can also be appreciated in the figure.
With respect to the difference in producers’ profits, denoted by ∆i in Theorem 3.3.2,
these differences may be positive or negative. Figures 3-2 and 3-3 present profits, under
both policies, for the producer with the best technology. In Figure 3-2, the parameters are
chosen such that this producer (one with cleanest technology) experiences decreasing profits
as the tax/ permit price increases. In this case, we observe a preference for tax regulation.
By contrast, in Figure 3-3, parameters are chosen such that the higher the tax/permit
price, the higher this producer profit. Here the producer satisfies the condition developed in
Proposition 3.3.1, guaranteeing increasing profits in tax regulation. Note that in this case,
the producer with best technology prefers a cap policy. Thus, the producer policy preference
in general depends on cost and technology information. However, the last statement of the
theorem says that in case of producers with similar costs and technology, everyone prefers
a tax regulation over a cap policy. Finally, the Theorem also suggests that when producers
are asymmetric, the producers having the worst technology always have a preference for a
tax policy.
To conclude, the Theorem implies that it is not possible to obtain a preference between a
tax regulation and a cap policy using performance measures such as expected consumer price,
expected demand satisfied, or expected externality level. That is, there is no difference between
the two policies along these three performance measures. However, there is a difference
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Figure 3-1: Impact on the central planner revenue for different targets of regulation.
Figure 3-2: Producer showing preference for tax regulation.
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Figure 3-3: Producer showing preference for cap regulation.
between a tax regulation and a cap policy with respect to the central planner’s collected
revenue and the producers expected profit.
As observed in Proposition 3.3.1 for a tax policy, producer’s i expected profit is increasing
in ξ if and only if:
∑n
j=1
tj−ti
aj
> tiA. The question is whether a similar statement is true
for a cap policy. Appendix 3.B provides a counterexample that shows that this is not true
in general. However, it is easy to show, by application of Jensen’s (see Appendix 3.C),
that there exists a lower bound to producer i’s expected profit that increases linearly with∑n
j=1
tj−ti
aj
− tiA.
It is possible that a different condition exists for a cap policy which will ensure that a
producer’s expected profit is increasing in pi. However, given the equivalence result presented
in the deterministic model (see Section 3.3.1), and the counterexample of Appendix 3.B,
which involves uncertain demand, one can expect that a condition guaranteeing increasing
profits with higher permit price under cap regulation must depend on the distribution of the
noise, θ.
Having established the main similarities and differences between tax and cap regulations,
one might suggests that reducing the risk faced by producers in a cap policy will reduce
the difference between a cap regulation and a tax policy. This motivates an analysis of a
third regulation: Cap-and-buyback. Here the central planner announces a buyback price
for unused permits, ρ, and commits to buying those permits at the end of the season, after
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demand is served. The following proposition, which is a counterpart for Proposition 3.3.2,
establishes the values of the various performance measures under a cap-and-buyback policy.
Proposition 3.3.3 (Cap-and-buyback). Let pi be there permit price, and ρ ∈ [0, pi] be the
buyback price for surplus permits. Then:
• Let p be the realized consumer price and δ be the indicator function. Then the optimal
amount of permits purchased by producer i is xi(ρ) = ti
p(θi)−ρti
ai
, where θi satisfies :
E[(p(θ)− p(θi))δ(θ ≥ θi)] = (pi − ρ)ti.
• For each producer, realized revenue from selling permits is decreasing in θ while realized
profits from production are increasing in θ.
• The total amount of permits purchased,
n∑
i=1
xi(ρ), is increasing in the buyback price, ρ.
• The realized price to the consumer, p(θ), is a convex piecewise linear function of the
uncertainty, θ.
• The expected price is: E[p] =
B+pi
n∑
i=1
ti
ai
A+
n∑
i=1
1
ai
• The expected externality level is: E[e] =
n∑
i=1
ti
ai
(E[p]− piti).
• The expected profit collected of producer i is: E[Πi] = 12aiE[min{p(θ)−ρti, p(θi)−ρti}2].
• The expected revenue collected by the regulator is :E[R] =
n∑
i=1
ti
ai
{(p(θi)− ρti)(pi − ρ) +
ρ(E[p]− piti)}.
Observe that a buyback price affect the total amount of permits purchased, yet the
expected externality level remains the same as in a cap policy. To explain this, note that
when realized demand is high, producers will have a higher production level under cap-and-
buyback than under a cap policy. However, when realized demand is low, producers under a
cap-and-buyback policy are better of selling some of the permits back to the central planner.
Thus, in this case, production level under cap-and-buyback will be smaller than production
level under a cap policy.
An interesting interpretation of the results is identifying cap-and-buyback regulation as
an interpolation between a tax policy and a cap regulation. For example, when the buyback
price equals the permit price, then there is no risk in stocking as many permits as desired,
and the policy effectively mimics a tax regulation (see Proposition 3.3.1). By contrast, when
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Policy Tax regulation Cap-and-buyback regulation Cap regulation
E[p]
B+ξ
n∑
i=1
ti
ai
A+
n∑
i=1
1
ai
B+pi
n∑
i=1
ti
ai
A+
n∑
i=1
1
ai
B+pi
n∑
i=1
ti
ai
A+
n∑
i=1
1
ai
E[e]
n∑
i=1
ti
ai
(E(p)− ξti)
n∑
i=1
ti
ai
(E(p)− piti)
n∑
i=1
ti
ai
(E(p)− piti)
E[Πi]
1
2ai
E((p(θ)− tiξ)2) 12aiE[min{p(θ)− ρti, p(θi)− ρti}2] E[
min{p(θ),p(θi)}2
2ai
]
E[R] ξ
n∑
i=1
ti
ai
(E(p)− ξti) (pi − ρ)
n∑
i=1
xi(ρ) + ρ
n∑
i=1
ti
ai
(E[p]− piti)
n∑
i=1
xi
Table 3.1: Comparison of cap, cap-and-buyback and tax regulation for a given pi, ξ.
the buyback price is zero, this policy is effectively a cap regulation as permits have no resale
value (see Proposition 3.3.2).
Table 3.1 shows the performance measures for the three policies studied for price taking
firms. Importantly, the results suggest that the three policies are identical from expected
market price and expected emission as long as the tax rate is equal to the permit price.
This implies that the conclusion of Theorem 3.3.2 still holds: a preference on which policy
to implement cannot be established solely by considering consumer price, expected satisfied
demand or expected externality level.
Of course, all our results are established under the assumption of a risk neutral central
planner. In this case, the three regulations have the same expected emission (externality)
level but realized emission is not the same. Therefore, a risk averse central planner will have
a regulation preference depending on its utility function.
Even though our results assume a limited support for the distribution of θ, in order to
guarantee that producers participate almost surely, our results do not make any assumptions
regarding the distribution of the noise within this range.
3.4 Price Making Firms
In this section we consider price making producers. That is, when choosing a supply function
that maximizes their expected profits, producers take into account the effect their supply
function has on market price. This immediately implies that producers are required to antic-
ipate other producers’ supply functions. To illustrate, consider the case where no regulation
is imposed. Given other producer’s supply function, producer i can determine the amount
that can be sold to the market at a given price p by means of the market equilibrium equation
(3.1) :
si(p) = D(p, θ)−
∑
j 6=i
sj(p) (3.4)
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The right hand side in Equation (3.4) is key to the producer’s supply function decision
problem, as it quantifies the residual demand, the portion of demand not satisfied by other
producers at a given price. As in Klemperer and Meyer (1989), maximization of expected
profit can be replaced by the maximization of profit with respect to p for each realization of
θ. Therefore, given a realization of demand θ, producer i finds the market price that would
result in maximum profit by solving:
max
p
(p− ci)[D(p, θ)−
∑
j 6=i
sj(p)] (3.5)
The producer then submits si(p
∗) = D(p∗, θ)−∑
j 6=i
sj(p
∗), where p∗ denotes the solution to
the optimization problem (3.5). Considering the first order optimality condition of problem
(3.5), for each producer i, yields the system of equations:
si(p)− [p− c′i(si(p))][A+
∑
j 6=i
s′j(p)] = 0 ∀i. (3.6)
Inspired by Baldick et al. (2004), we find a solution that satisfies the system of equations by
proposing a solution of a reasonable form, for example in this unregulated case si(p) = bip,
and then determine appropriate values for the constants {bi}ni=1 by solving the system of
equations defined by (3.6). Having found a solution, we proceed to obtain performance
measures as in Section 3.3.
We compare the impact of tax and cap-and-trade regulations. For this purpose, we
develop two propositions. Proposition 3.4.1 analyzes how a particular tax rate ξ affects the
market under tax regulation. Proposition 3.4.2 analyzes the effect a permit price pi has on
the market under cap-and-trade regulation.
To introduce Proposition 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, we start with the following definition.
Definition 3.4.1. Consider the following function bi : N→ R, defined as:
bi(m) =
1
2(m− 1)
(m− 2)ai − A+
√
(
m− 2
ai
− A)2 + 4(m− 1)A
ai
 .
One interesting property of bi(m) is that as m grows to infinity, bi(m) approaches
1
ai
, a
factor commonly used in the expressions derived in Section 3.3. Moreover, as we shall see,
many of the results derived in the price taking setting can be recovered just by replacing
bi(m) by
1
ai
.
Given uncertain demand, and using the assumptions stated in Section 3.2, one can estab-
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lish the following expressions for the relevant performance measures under a tax regulation:
Proposition 3.4.1 (Oligopoly tax regulation). Consider a tax regulation under stochastic
demand. Let ξ be the tax price. Then, there exists a supply function equilibrium such that:
• The expected price to the consumer is: E[p] =
B+ξ
n∑
i=1
tibi(n)
A+
n∑
i=1
bi(n)
• The expected externality level is: E[e] =
n∑
i=1
tibi(n)(E[p]− tiξ)
• The expected profit for producer i is: E[Πi] = bi(n)(1− 12aibi(n))E[(p(θ)− tiξ)2].
• Producer’s j expected profit is increasing in ξ if and only if:
n∑
i=1
bi(n)(ti − tj) ≥ tjA
• The expected revenue collected by the regulator is a concave function of ξ.
Proposition 3.4.1, is the counterpart of Proposition 3.3.1 from Section 3.3. As such, much
of the analysis from Proposition 3.3.1 can be extended to this setting.
Having stated the main result for tax regulation, what follows is a similar result for cap-
and-trade regulation. Our model of cap-and-trade, involves adding a trading stage to the
cap regulation studied in Section 3.3. To be precise, we start by clarifying the sequence of
events and the decisions involved:
1. The regulator announces a permit price pi.
2. Producers purchase permits that maximize their expected profits. By introducing some
additional notation we can write the optimization problem faced by producers as:
max
xi≥0
E[p(θ)si(p(θ))− ci(si(p(θ)))− ρ(θ)τi(θ)]− pixi,
where τ(θ) denotes the realized transferences that occur in the trading. For example,
if τi(θ) is positive it means producer i purchased τi(θ) permits, while if the value is
negative it means producer i sold τi(θ) permits. Here ρ(θ) is the realized trading price
of the permits.
3. The additive noise, θ is realized. In this stage producers are allowed to trade permits
among themselves. To determine the outcome of trading, as well as the production
quantities for producers after trading is finished, each producer solves the problem:
max
ui≥0
tiui≤xi+τi
pui − ci(ui)− ρτi.
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Here ui is the realized production quantity, τi, the realized traded amount and ρ the
realized trading price. This problem yields a production quantity, ui, and a trading
amount, τi, both of these quantities depend on the market price, p, and realized trading
price, ρ. Market clearing conditions are used to determine the realized permit trading
price, ρ, and the realized market price, p.
• To determine the realized permit trading price ρ, the permit market clearing
condition is
n∑
i=1
τi = 0.
• To determine the realized market price, p, The market clearing condition is
n∑
i=1
ui = D(p, θ).
4. Realized demand is served. That is, producer i delivers ui units to satisfy consumer
demand, and sells (buys) τi permits at a price ρ.
In this setting the value of θ as well as xi are known before trading occurs. The outcome
of the trading stage can be characterized by three parameters: {ui}ni=1 the amount of realized
demand satisfied by each producer, {τi}ni=1 the realized permits purchased (sold if the value
is negative) and ρ the realized permit trading price.
The outcome of the trading stage for a given θ can be found by solving an integer program.
Moreover, closed form solutions can be derived depending on the sign, positive or zero, of
the permit trading price and whether the constraint tiui ≤ τi is binding or not. In order
to obtain a simple closed form solution, enabling us to compare results with tax policy, we
restrict the support of the distribution of θ to guarantee that no producer sells all of its
permits and the permit trading price is positive, almost surely. The results are summarized
in Proposition 3.4.2.
Proposition 3.4.2 (Cap-and-trade). Consider a cap-and-trade regulation and stochastic
demand. Let pi be the permit price. Then there exists an interval, such that if θ ∈ [θ0, θ∞]
almost surely, then:
• Each producer satisfies a portion of demand, namely, ui > 0 ∀i almost surely.
• Permit trading price, ρ, is positive almost surely.
• The expected price satisfies:
E[p(θ)] =
B + ρ¯
n∑
i=1
tibi(n)
A+
n∑
i=1
bi(n)
,
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where ρ¯ is the expected permit trading price.
• The expected externality level is: E[e] = ∑ni=1 tibi(n)(E[p]− ρ¯ti).
• Producer’s i expected profit is: E[Πi] = E[bi(n)(p(θ)−ρ(θ)ti)2(1− 12aibi(n))]−(pi− ρ¯)xi,
where xi denotes the amount of permits purchased by producer i.
Table 3.2 summarizes expected consumer price and expected externality level under both
tax policy and cap-and-trade, as provided by Propositions 3.4.1 and 3.4.2.
Policy Tax Cap-and-trade
E[p]
B+ξ
n∑
i=1
tibi(n)
A+
n∑
i=1
bi(n)
B+ρ¯
n∑
i=1
tibi(n)
A+
n∑
i=1
bi(n)
E[e]
n∑
i=1
tibi(n)(E(p)− ξti)
n∑
i=1
tibi(n)(E(p)− ρ¯ti)
Table 3.2: Comparison of cap-and-trade and tax regulation.
As one can see, if the tax rate, ξ, equals the expected permit trading price, ρ¯, then
the two policies have exactly the same expected externality levels and the same expected
market price. This result is similar to the one developed in Section 3.3 for the price taking
model. Indeed, Table 3.1 shows that if tax rate is equal to permit price then expected
externality level and expected consumer price are the same under tax policy, cap policy and
cap-and-buyback policy.
Unfortunately, unlike the price taking model, we cannot establish that expected revenue
is higher for the central planner under a cap-and-trade regulation. In fact, Figure 3-4 illus-
trates two observations obtained by numerical examples with four producers, see details in
Appendix 3.F. First, the permit selling price can be much smaller than the expected trading
price. Second, the expected revenue collected by the central planner under the tax policy is
not necessarily smaller than the revenue collected under the cap-and-trade policy.
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(a) Relation between expected trading price for
permits and permit price.
(b) Comparison of (expected) revenue collected
by the central planner under cap-and-trade and
tax policy.
Figure 3-4: Numerical results for cap-and-trade and tax regulation.
3.5 Conclusion
The objective of this work is to identify differences between permit regulations, or quota
systems, and a tax regulation. We show that in the absence of uncertainty both methods are
equivalent. That is, if the tax rate and permit price are such that both regulations deliver
the same externality level, then the consumer price, demand satisfaction, producer profits
and revenue to the central planner is the same under both regulations. Of course, from an
implementation point of view, these two policies may be quite different, see Avi-Yonah and
Uhlmann (2009).
By contrast, when demand is stochastic, the various policies agree on some dimensions
and differ on others. For example, when considering price taking producers, a permit regu-
lation such as cap or cap-and-buyback, and a tax regulation that achieve the same expected
externality level lead to the same expected consumer price. However, these policies lead to
different central planner’s revenue and producers expected profits. Importantly, producers
with high emission rates always prefer tax to permit regulations while those with clean tech-
nology sometimes prefer permit policies. In addition, under some conditions that are easy
to verify, producers with clean technology will face higher expected profits as the tax rate
increases, which is quite a surprising insight of this analysis.
Finally, in the price taking model, the central planner’s expected revenue is always higher
under a permit policy, such as cap or cap-and-buyback, than under a tax policy. In addition,
in the case of tax regulation the expected revenue collected by the central planner is concave
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in the tax rate, and therefore experiences decreasing returns on scale. This implies that
as the tax rate increases, the additional revenue collected in this policy decreases. This
is noteworthy, as the decrease may get to a point where the central planner loses revenue
by increasing the tax rate. Therefore, a marginal increase in tax beyond this point would
decrease the central planner’s revenue, and possibly producers’ profit. In a situation such as
this, combining tax regulation with other externality reducing policies, such as subsidies to
invest in cleaner technology, should be considered.
In an economy where few producers dominate the market, price making producers provide
a better model. Under such framework, we are able to compare the performance of cap-and-
trade and tax regulation. We found, under some conditions, that if we select the permit
price/ tax rate such that both policies achieve the same externality level, the expected price
to the consumer is the same under both policies. This is consistent with our results from the
price taking framework, suggesting that differences in the environmental policies are not in
the expected consumer price, but rather in the producers’ profits as well as revenue collected
by the regulator.
An important limitation of our model is that the permit policy requires the central
planner to anticipate the price of the permit that would lead to the desirable expected level
of externality. In practice this is done through an auction mechanism that provides an
effective way to distribute the permits. One possible way to extend our model to this setting
is to apply a uniform price auction where the central planner hold back some of the permits
when the permit price is too low. In this case, Back and Zender (2001) shows that the
central planner can extract all the benefit of the permit, the central planner can sell all the
permits and bidders cannot benefit from gaming the system, when there is a large number
of bidders. This result suggests that when in the presence of a large number of firms, our
results would not be affected by the introduction of an auction mechanism.
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3.A Proofs
3.A.1 Theorem 3.3.1
1. Under tax regulation producer i faces the production problem:
max
qi≥0
pqi − ci(qi)− ξtiqi.
Denote s˜i(p, ξ) the supply function in this setting. Grouping the terms with qi and
recognizing terms, the following identity can be established:
s˜i(p, ξ) = si(p− tiξ),
where si is the optimal supply function in the unregulated case. The definition of
market equilibrium implies that:
F (p, ξ) =
n∑
i=1
si(p− tiξ)−D(p) = 0. (3.7)
Notice that F (p, ξ) is increasing in p, decreasing in ξ. Therefore, p(ξ) the equilibrium
price is increasing in ξ.
2. In order to prove the existence of the appropriate tax we make use of the following
lemma, proven below.
Lemma 3.A.1. Consider a function F (p, ξ) continuous, nondecreasing in p and non
increasing in ξ, and a function G(p, ξ), continuous, nondecreasing in p and non in-
creasing in ξ, X ∈ (0,+∞). If F and G satisfies the following properties:
(a) F (0, 0) < 0.
(b) lim
p→+∞
F (p, ξ) > 0, ∀ξ.
(c) lim
ξ→+∞
G(p, ξ) = 0, ∀p.
(d) lim
p→+∞
G(p, ξ) > X, ∀ξ.
Then either there exists p∗ and ξ∗ such that F (p∗, ξ∗) = 0 and G(p∗, ξ∗) = X or there ex-
ists nondecreasing sequences (pj)j≥0 and (ξj)j≥0 such that F (pj, ξj) = 0, G(pj, ξj+1) =
X, pj → +∞, ξj → +∞.
Using the lemma, consider F (p, ξ) =
∑n
i=1 s˜i(p, ξ) − D(p), G(p, ξ) =
∑n
i=1 tis˜i(p, ξ).
Both F and G are continuous, and satisfy the monotonicity properties required by
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Lemma 3.A.1. Also notice that F (0, 0) = −D(0) < 0 and checking the rest of the
properties are straightforward as they are defined by the supply functions. Finally, we
have to check that the prices and taxes cannot approach infinity.
Assume we have nondecreasing sequences (pj)j≥0 and (ξj)j≥0 such that F (pj, ξj) = 0,
G(pj, ξj+1) = X, pj → +∞, ξj → +∞. This implies:
F (pj, ξ) =
n∑
i=1
s˜i(p
j, ξ)−D(pj) ∀ξ
X = G(pj, ξj+1) =
∑
tis˜i(p
j, ξj+1) ≤ max
k
{tk}
∑
s˜i(p
j, ξj+1)
Since ti > 0 ∀i, we obtain that
∑
s˜i(p
j, ξj+1) ≥ X
maxk{tk} and hence:
0 = F (pj, ξj) ≥ F (pj, ξj+1) =
∑
s˜i(p
j, ξj+1)−D(pj) ≥ X
maxk{tk} −D(p
j)
Since X > 0, and D(pj) is smaller than  = X
2 maxk{tk} for large enough j, we obtain a
contradiction. Hence the result of the theorem follows.
To prove the relation between X and ξ, we prove it in a more general context of
stochastic demand and strictly convex cost. In this setting we denote:
(a) s˜i(p, ξ) = arg max
q≥0
(p− tiξ)q − ci(q)
(b) Let p(ξ, θ) be a solution of the equation
∑n
i=1 s˜i(p, ξ) = D(p, θ).
Observe that many of the properties are inherited from the deterministic setting, such
as the super modularity of the objective function. the main difference is the added
parameter in demand, as well as now the externality level is a random variable.
Hence from (a), we get that:
s˜i(p, ξ) = si(p− tiξ).
This together with (b) implies that
f(p, ξ, θ) =
n∑
i=1
si(p− tiξ)−D(p, θ) = 0. (3.8)
Notice that f(p, ξ, θ) is increasing in p, decreasing in ξ and θ. Therefore, p(ξ, θ) is
increasing in ξ and θ.
56
Let g(ξ) = E[
∑n
i=1 tisi(p(ξ, θ) − tiξ)], be the expected externality level, we want to
prove that this is decreasing in ξ. To show that g(ξ) is decreasing in ξ, assume without
loss of generality that t1 ≤ t2 ≤ · · · ≤ tn. We rewrite g(ξ)
g(ξ) = E[
n∑
i=1
(ti − ti−1)Si(ξ, θ)],
where t0 = 0 and
Si(ξ, θ) =
n∑
l=i
sl(p(ξ, θ)− tlξ).
The equation (3.8) implies that S1(ξ, θ) is decreasing in ξ. We will prove that Si(ξ, θ)
is decreasing in ξ. To see this, consider any two points ξ and ξ′ with ξ < ξ′. Since
S1(ξ, θ) ≥ S1(ξ′, θ) and p(ξ, θ)− tiξ and p(ξ′, θ)− tiξ′ are decreasing in i, there exists
an index i0 such that
p(ξ, θ)− tiξ ≥ p(ξ′, θ)− tiξ′
for i ≥ i0 and
p(ξ, θ)− tiξ ≤ p(ξ′, θ)− tiξ′
for i ≤ i0. Since si(p) is increasing in p, we have that
Si(ξ, θ)− Si(ξ′, θ) =
{ ∑n
l=i(sl(p(ξ, θ)− tlξ)− sl(p(ξ′, θ)− tlξ′)), if i ≥ i0
S1(ξ, θ)− S1(ξ′, θ)−
∑i
l=1(sl(p(ξ, θ)− tlξ)− sl(p(ξ′, θ)− tlξ′)), if i ≤ i0,
The above formula immediately implies that Si(ξ, θ) ≥ Si(ξ′, θ) for i = 1, . . . , n.
Therefore, g(ξ) is decreasing in ξ, which implies that the solution g(ξ) = X is decreasing
in X. That is, the larger the externality level required, the smaller the tax rate.
Proof of Lemma 3.A.1
We create sequences that will converge p∗, and ξ∗. First, consider ξ0 = 0. Given
that F (0, ξ0) < 0 by property 2a, lim
p→+∞
F (p, ξ0) > 0 by property2b, and continuity,
then the intermediate value theorem implies that there exists p0 ∈ (0,+∞) such that
F (p0, ξ0) = 0. In case there exists more than one possibility we choose the smallest
value, given this value there are 3 possibilities:
(a) G(p0, ξ0) = X.
(b) G(p0, ξ0) < X.
(c) G(p0, ξ0) > X.
57
In the first case the lemma is proven. In the second case we will find ξn+1 such
that G(pn, ξn+1) = X, due to the monotonicity of G we know that ξn+1 ∈ (−∞, ξn).
Due to the monotonicity of F we have F (pn, ξn+1) ≥ 0, and therefore, using the
intermediate values theorem for F we have that there exists pn+1 ∈ [0, pn] such that
F (pn+1, ξn+1) = 0, and due to the monotonicity of G, we have G(pn+1, ξn+1) ≤ X. If
G(pn+1, ξn+1) = X we are done, otherwise we continue to generate elements. Since
pj is bounded within [0, p0] and non increasing we have that pj → p∗, using this fact
and property 2c we find that ξ is also bounded, and hence ξj → ξ∗. Now to prove the
required property, we use the fact that F and G are continuous and therefore:
0 = F (pj, ξj)→ F (p∗, ξ∗), X = G(pj, ξj+1)→ G(p∗, ξ∗)
The third case is more complex, and will generate sequences in a very similar form.
Suppose that we have pn ∈ [pn−1,+∞), ξn ∈ (ξn−1,+∞) such that F (pn, ξn) = 0 and
G(pn, ξn) > X, then using the intermediate value theorem for G, there exists ξn+1 such
that G(pn, ξn+1) = X, due to the monotonicity of G we know that ξn+1 ∈ (ξn,+∞).
Due to the monotonicity of F we have F (pn, ξn+1) ≤ 0, and therefore, using the
intermediate values theorem for F we have that there exists pn+1 ∈ [pn,+∞) such that
F (pn+1, ξn+1) = 0, and due to the monotonicity of G, we have G(pn+1, ξn+1) ≥ X. If
G(pn+1, ξn+1) = X we are done, otherwise we continue to generate elements.
Hence either we found (p∗, ξ∗) or we have (pj)j≥0 and (ξj)j≥0, both non decreasing
sequences, and therefore with well defined limits (that may be infinite). If the limit of
pj is finite, then it has a limit pj → p∗. Using this fact and property 2c we find that ξ
is also bounded, and hence ξj → ξ∗. Now to prove the required property, we use the
fact that F and G are continuous and therefore:
0 = F (pj, ξj)→ F (p∗, ξ∗), X = G(pj, ξj+1)→ G(p∗, ξ∗)
It remains to prove that if the limit is not finite, then there is no finite solution
such that F (p∗, ξ∗) = 0 and G(p∗, ξ∗) = X. Suppose there exists p∗, ξ∗ such that
F (p∗, ξ∗) = 0 and G(p∗, ξ∗) = X, we will prove that pj ≤ p∗ and ξj ≤ ξ∗, hence giving
a contradiction, as then the sequences would be bounded and monotone, meaning they
converge. Notice that we are still in case 3, therefore given our choice of p0 as the
smallest such that F (p0, 0) = 0 and case 3, we have that ξ∗ > 0 = ξ0. Notice that
F (p∗, ξ0) ≥ F (p∗, ξ∗) = 0 = F (p0, ξ0), given our choice of p0 we find that p∗ ≥ p0.
Suppose p∗ ≥ pj, ξ∗ ≥ ξj,∀j ≤ n. Then, G(pn, ξn+1) = G(p∗, ξ∗) = X ≤ G(p∗, ξn+1)
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due to monotonicity of G. Due to our choice of ξn+1 as the smallest that satisfies said
property, we have that ξn+1 ≤ ξ∗. Now, F (p∗, ξn+1) ≥ F (p∗, ξ∗) = 0 = F (pn+1, ξn+1)
then given our choice of the smallest, such that satisfies F (pn+1, ξn+1) = 0, we conclude
pn+1 ≤ p∗. And therefore the sequences would converge.
3. Under cap regulation, given pi producers face the problem:
vi(p, xi) = max
0≤q≤xi
ti
{pq − ci(q)}
Denote the solution si(p, xi). Additionally, xi satisfies:
xi ∈ arg max{vi(p, xi)− pixi}
And the coupling constraint balancing supply and demand:
n∑
i=1
sˆi(p, xi) = D(p).
Now we restrict ourselves to producers that participate in the market. Given that
pi > 0, si(p, xi) =
xi
ti
. Under a cap-and-buyback regulation, where the buyback price is
smaller than the permit price, this remains true.
Through a change of variables, and rewriting the maximization problem for xi, the
optimal ui =
xi
ti
then satisfies:
ui ∈ arg max{pui − ci(ui)− tipiui}
A posteriori we can see this is satisfied also when the producer does not have incentive
to participate in the market. From here we can see that when pi = ξ the two regulations
coincide.
3.A.2 Proposition 3.3.1
Production almost surely can be guaranteed by the condition θ0 ≥ ((A+
∑n
i=1
1
ai
) max
j=1,...,n
{tj}−∑n
i=1 ti
1
ai
)ξ −B
Under a tax regulation:
n∑
i=1
si(p(θ)− tiξ) = D(p(θ), θ)
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Hence under quadratic cost linear demand assumptions we have:
n∑
i=1
(
p(θ)− tiξ
ai
)+ = B − Ap(θ) + θ. (3.9)
Under assumption that producers participate for all realizations of uncertainty, we have
that the price as a random variable satisfies:
n∑
i=1
p− tiξ
ai
= B − Ap+ θ
Using equation (3.9), the expected price:
p(θ) =
(B + θ + ξ
∑n
i=1
ti
ai
)
(A+
∑n
i=1
1
ai
)
∀θ
Thus E[p] =
B+ξ
∑n
i=1
ti
ai
A+
∑n
i=1
1
ai
.
The expected externality level under these assumptions satisfy:
E[e] = E[
n∑
i=1
tisi(p(θ)− tiξ)] = E[
n∑
i=1
ti
p(θ)− tiξ
ai
] =
n∑
i=1
ti
ai
(E[p]− ξti)
Replacing the expected price yields the result.
The profit for a producer is:
E[Πi] = E[p(θ)
(pθ)− tiξ)
ai
− 1
2
ai
(p(θ)− tiξ)2
a2i
− tiξ (pθ)− tiξ)
ai
] =
1
2ai
E[(p(θ)− tiξ)2].
Let νi = (A+
∑n
j=i
1
aj
)−1. We can expand p(θ) in the profits expression and we obtain:
E[Πi] =
1
2ai
E[ρ21(B + θ + ξ
n∑
j=1
tj
aj
))2 − 2ρ1(B + θ + ξ
n∑
j=1
tj
aj
)tiξ + t
2
i ξ
2]
=
ρ21
2ai
(B2 + V (θ) + 2B
n∑
j=1
tjξ
aj
+ (
n∑
j=1
tjξ
aj
)2 − 2ρ−11 (B +
n∑
j=1
tjξ
aj
)tiξ + ρ
−2
1 (t
2
i ξ
2)
=
ρ21
2ai
(V (θ) + (B + ξ(
n∑
j=1
tj − ti
aj
− tiA))2)
Where V denotes the variance of the random variable. From here by taking derivatives, we
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can see that the condition for increasing profits on the tax is:
n∑
j=1
tj − ti
aj
> tiA.
To see the concavity in the central planner expected revenue observe that after replacing
the expected price, the expected revenue is:
E[Rt] =
ξ
A+
∑n
i=1
1
ai
(B
n∑
i=1
ti
ai
+ ξ((
n∑
i=1
ti
ai
)2 −
n∑
i=1
t2i
ai
n∑
j=1
1
aj
− A
n∑
i=1
t2i
ai
)).
We consider a random variable t such that P(t = ti) =
1
ai∑n
j=1
1
aj
. Then:
V (t) =
∑n
i=1
t2i
ai∑n
i=1
1
ai
−
(
∑n
j=1
tj
aj
)2
(
∑n
i=1
1
ai
)2
≥ 0
And hence the expected revenue is concave.
3.A.3 Proposition 3.3.2
• We start by finding the optimality conditions in the case of permit regulation. We do
this in a more general case of convex cost and linear demand with an additive noise.
Given pi there are three conditions that are satisfied in market equilibrium:
– Let vi(p, xi) = max
0≤q≤xi
ti
{pq − ci(q)}. Let sˆi(p, xi) be the unique optimal solution.
– Let p(θ) be a solution of
∑n
i=1 sˆi(p(θ), xi) = D(p(θ), θ)
– xi ∈ arg max
xi≥0
E[vi(p(θ), xi)]− pixi
Consider si(p) = arg max{pq − ci(q)}, and denote θi, the value of a realization of un-
certainty such that si(p(θi)) =
xi
ti
. Such value is uniquely defined as we are considering
a continuous random variable. Observe that the optimization problem vi(p, xi), can be
rewritten depending on the value of the multiplier associated with the inequality q ≤ xi
ti
.
For the values of p such that the multiplier is zero, we have that sˆi(p, xi) = si(p), for
the values of p such that the multiplier is positive we have sˆi(p(θ), xi) =
xi
ti
. Then
we can use a change of variables and rewrite sˆi(p(θ), xi) = min{si(p(θ)), si(p(θi))}.
Rewriting the condition for optimal permits yield:
θi ∈ arg max
si(p(θi))≥0
E[p(θ)min{si(p(θ)), si(p(θi))} − ci(min{si(p(θ)), si(p(θi))})]− pitisi(p(θi)).
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We can rewrite the objective function into:
E[(p(θ)si(p(θ))−ci(si(p(θ)))δ(θ ≤ θi)]+E[p(θ)δ(θ > θi)]si(p(θi))−ci(si(p(θi)))P(θ ≥ θi)−pitisi(p(θi)).
Where δ denotes the indicator function. We can then solve the optimization problem
similar to a news-vendor problem to obtain the condition:
E[(p(θ)− p(θi))δ(θ > θi)] = piti.
• Under quadratic costs, we can write the supply function as:
si(p) =
p+
ai
.
We consider a extension of si :
ri(p) =
p
ai
.
To prove the existence of the optimal values θi, we make use of the following lemma
first.
Lemma 3.A.2. Assume the equilibrium p is increasing. Order the producer’s such
that t1 ≥ t2 ≥ . . . ≥ tn, and consider the values θb(1) ≤ θb(2) ≤ . . . ≤ θb(n) as described
before. Then b(i) = i.
Proof.[Lemma] From equation (3.3) and the assumption that all producers participate
in the market:
piti = E[(p(θ)− p(θi))δ(θ > θi)]. (3.10)
We define a function using the right hand side f(θ¯) = E[(p(θ) − p(θ¯))δ(θ > θ¯))], and
decrease its values until we find a producer such that (3.3) is satisfied. Since f does
not depend on i given the equilibrium price function, and the producer’s are ordered
increasing in technology, using (3.10), we obtain that b(i) = i.
Consider θ′ ≥ E[θ]− Apitn, Jensen’s inequality tells us Apitn ≥ E[(θ − θ′)δ(θ > θ′)] =
E[(θ−θ′)+] ≥ E[θ−θ′] = E[θ]−θ′, We define p0(θ) in the range θ ≥ θ′, as the solution
to D(p0(θ), θ) = 0. Using the Lemma and (3.10), we obtain that θn solves:
g(p0, θn) = pitn.
Where g(p, θ∗) = E[(p(θ) − p(θ∗))δ(θ > θ∗)]. Hence we extend p0 until we reach the
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equality. Now assume that we know the values θj, j = i, . . . , n and p
0(θ) for θ ≥ θi.
We determine θi−1 and p0(θ) for θ ∈ [θi−1, θi) by setting
n∑
j=i
rj(p
0(θ)) = D(p0(θ), θ) +
n∑
j=i
rj(p
0(θj)),
or equivalently
n∑
j=i
(rj(p
0(θ))− rj(p0(θj))) = D(p0(θ), θ). (3.11)
We stop at the first θ, denoted as θi−1, such that
piti−1 = g(p0, θ).
Given the quadratic costs and linear demand, rj(·) becomes linear in the domain of our
concern. Thus, solving the above equation, we have that p0(θ) is linear for θ ∈ [θi−1, θi)
with a slope
νi = (A+
n∑
j=i
1
ai
)−1.
Repeat this processes until we assign θ1.
Observe that θi is invariant to linear shifts of p
0. We prove this using induction on i.
For θn, as we define p
0(θ) in this range as the solution to D(p0(θ), θ) = 0, we have that
is linear, and hence the solution θn to g(p
0, θn) = pitn, remains the same for a shift in
the function p0. Given that θj remain unchanged for j ≥ i+ 1, by observing that:
g(p0, θi) = E[(p
0(θ)− p0(θi))δ(θ ≥ θi)]
= E[(p0(θ)− p0(θi))δ(θ ∈ [θi, θi+1))] +E[(p0(θ)− p0(θi+1))δ(θ ≥ θi+1)]
+E[(p0(θi+1)− p0(θi))δ(θ ≥ θi+1)]
We can see that terms are invariant to shifts due to the piecewise linear structure of
p0(θ) and the induction hypothesis. And hence, θi is invariant to shifts in p
0(θ).
As a conclusion, we notice that the values (θi)
n
i=1 depend only on the uncertainty, the
technologies and pi. Another thing to notice is that θi is independent of (θj)j<i.
In order to find the appropriate value for p(θi) we solve the following system of linear
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equations:
n∑
i=1
si(min{p(θi), p(θk)}) = D(p(θk), θk) ∀k = 1, . . . , n.
Subject to the constraints that p(θi) ≥ 0. This can be written as:
M~p = B~1+ ~θ
p ≥ 0
Where:
Mij =

0 if i < j
1
νi
if i = j
1
aj
if i > j
Observe that we have n l.i. constraints for n variables, hence we have unique solution
in case of existence. On the other hand as M is a triangular matrix with nonzero
diagonal, we have existence.
Having defined p(θi) to find p(θ) for a general θ we can again use the equation:
n∑
i=1
si(min{p(θi), p(θ)}) = D(p(θ), θ).
Moreover we can write :
p(θ) = min p
s.t.
∑n
i=1 yi = B − Ap+ θ
aiyi ≤ p
tiyi ≤ xi
p ≥ 0
y ≥ 0
Where tixi = p(θi), linear programming results show that p is piecewise linear and
convex in θ. This proves the first item of the results.
We now prove that θpii is decreasing in pi. Notice that
pi(ti−1 − ti) = g(p, θi−1)− g(p, θi)
= E[(p(θ)− p(θi))δ(θ ∈ (θi−1, θi])] + (p(θi)− p(θi−1))E[δ(θ > θi−1)]
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Since p(θ) is linear for θ ∈ [θi−1, θi] with slope νi, we have that
pi(ti−1 − ti)
νi
= E[(θ − θi−1)δ(θ ≥ θi−1)]− E[(θ − θi)δ(θ ≥ θi)]
Hence by denoting G(q) = E[(θ− q)δ(θ ≥ q)], we can generate a recursion and obtain:
G(θi) =
n+1∑
j=i+1
pi(tj−1 − tj)
νj
From here we can see that θi is decreasing on pi since G is decreasing.
Using the previous polyhedral characterization we can prove monotonicity on the per-
mits bought by each producer.
We have:
M~p = B~1+ ~θ
And hence:
D−1~p = (MD)−1(B~1+ ~θ),
where D is a diagonal matrix with ai in ith element of the diagonal. Using this
equation and the monotonicity of θ proven before, we can prove monotonicity for the
total amount of permits purchased
∑n
i=1 xi.
Consider the matrix:
Q =

0 if i < j
ν˜i if i = j
−ν˜iν˜j
∏i−1
l=j+1(1− ν˜l) if i > j
Where ν˜i =
νi
ai
. It is easy to check that (MDQ)ii = 1 ∀i, for a general term, we have:
(MDQ)ij = ν˜i(1−
i−1∏
l=j+1
(1− ν˜l)−
i−1∑
k=j+1
ν˜k
i−1∏
l=k+1
(1− ν˜l))
The term in parenthesis is zero, we can see this by interpreting each of ν˜l as the
probability of heads of an independent coin. The term in the sum is the probability
of a head occurring (either the first coin was heads, or it was tails and the second
was heads, and so forth and so on). The product term is the probability of no heads
occurring. Hence any outcome of the coins is included here, and the sum of these
probabilities has to add up to one, meaning the term in the parenthesis is zero. Hence
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Q = (MD)−1. Replacing in the system of equations we have that the ith equation is:
pi
ai
= (ν˜i +
i−1∑
j=1
(MD)−1ij )B + ν˜iθi +
i−1∑
j=1
(MD)−1ij θj.
Hence,
xi
ti
= Bν˜i(1−
i−1∑
j=1
ν˜j
j−1∏
l=i+1
(1− ν˜l)) + ν˜iθi(1−
i−1∑
j=1
ν˜j
j−1∏
l=i+1
(1− ν˜l)θj
θi
).
Therefore,
n∑
i=1
xi =
n∑
i=1
tiBν˜i(1−
i−1∑
j=1
ν˜j
j−1∏
l=i+1
(1− ν˜l)) + ν˜i(θi −
i−1∑
j=1
ν˜j
j−1∏
l=i+1
(1− ν˜l)θj).
We invert the order of the sum for the last term, to be precise we use:
n∑
i=1
tiν˜i(θi −
i−1∑
j=1
ν˜j
j−1∏
l=i+1
(1− ν˜l)θj) =
n∑
i=1
ν˜iθiti −
n−1∑
j=1
n∑
i=j+1
tiν˜iν˜jθj
j−1∏
l=i+1
(1− ν˜l))
Finally,
n∑
i=1
xi =
n∑
i=1
tiBν˜i(1−
i−1∑
j=1
ν˜j
j−1∏
l=i+1
(1− ν˜l)) +
n∑
i=1
ν˜iθiti(1−
n−1∑
j=i+1
tj
ti
ν˜j
j−1∏
l=i+1
(1− ν˜l))
Finally Lemma 3.A.2, states that tj < ti for j > i. Combining this with:
i−1∑
j=1
ν˜j
j−1∏
l=i+1
(1− ν˜l) < 1,
n−1∑
j=i+1
ν˜j
j−1∏
l=i+1
(1− ν˜l)) < 1,
we conclude the result. This last observations come from the fact that if we see each
ν˜l as the probability of heads for an independent coin, then this expression is the
probability that a head occurs. Therefore as θi increases,
∑n
i=1 xi increases.
• So far, we have developed the following:
66
– Optimal permits, can be translated to a condition on θi:
E[(p(θ)− p(θi)δ(θ ≥ θi)] = piti.
– Price as random variable satisfies the equation:
n∑
i=1
min{p(θ), p(θi)}
ai
= B − Ap(θ) + θ. a.s.
Observe that his expressions are valid when all producers participate in the market.
Otherwise the optimal permits for the producer are zero.
Given that for all θ, we have:
n∑
i=1
min{p(θ), p(θi)}
ai
= B − Ap(θ) + θ.
Then the expected value of the left hand side, should be equal to the expected value
of the right hand side.
The expected value of the left hand side:
E[
n∑
i=1
min{p(θ), p(θi)}
ai
] =
n∑
i=1
E[
min{p(θ), p(θi)}
ai
]
=
n∑
i=1
1
ai
E[p(θ)δ(θ ≤ θi) + p(θi)δ(θ ≥ θi)]
=
n∑
i=1
1
ai
E[p(θ)δ(θ ≤ θi) + p(θ)δ(θ ≥ θi)− piti]
=
n∑
i=1
E[p]− piti
ai
The expected value of the right hand side:
E[B − Ap(θ) + θ] = B − AE[p].
Using these two expressions we find that:
E[p] =
B + pi
∑n
i=1
ti
ai
A+
∑n
i=1
1
ai
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• The expected externality level in this case are:
E[
n∑
i=1
ti
min{p(θ), p(θi)}
ai
] =
n∑
i=1
ti
ai
(E[p]− piti)
Where we used again that E[min{p(θ), p(θi)}] = E[p]− piti. Replacing the value of the
expected price yields the result.
• Under quantity regulation the expected profit is:
E[Πc] = E[p(θ)
min{p(θ), p(θi)}
ai
− 1
2
ai(
min{p(θ), p(θi)}
ai
)2]− pitip(θi)
ai
= E[
1
2ai
p(θ)2δ(θ ≤ θi) + p(θi)
ai
(p(θ)δ(θ ≥ θi)− piti − 1
2
p(θi)δ(θ ≥ θi))]
= E[
1
2ai
p(θ)2δ(θ ≤ θi) + p(θi)
2
2ai
δ(θ ≥ θi))]
= E[min{p(θ), p(θi)}2]
• The central planner revenue is the total amount of permits sold times the permit price:
Rc = pi(
n∑
i=1
ti
ai
p(θi))
Thus proving all the results.
3.A.4 Theorem 3.3.2
• If we want the same expected externality level under both regulations, we then require:
n∑
j=1
tj
aj
(
B + pi
n∑
i=1
ti
ai
A+
n∑
i=1
1
ai
− pitj) =
n∑
j=1
tj
aj
(
(B + ξ
n∑
i=1
ti
ai
)
A+
n∑
i=1
1
ai
− ξtj)
Or equivalently:
(pi − ξ)(
n∑
j=1
tj
aj
(
n∑
i=1
ti − tj
ai
)) = 0
Which we can rewrite into:
(pi − ξ)((
n∑
j=1
tj
aj
)2 − (
n∑
i=1
t2i
ai
)(
n∑
i=1
1
ai
)− A
n∑
i=1
ti) = 0
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Using the same reasoning as in Proposition 3.3.1, we prove that the second factor is
negative. And hence pi = ξ.
• Having that pi = ξ, replacing in the expressions from Proposition 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, we
observe that the expected price is the same under both regulations.
• Given that demand is linear and our assumption of all producers participating, we see
that the expected demand served is the same under both regulations.
• Using this and the fact that, min{p(θ), p(θi)} ≤ p(θi) we can prove that the central
planner revenue is higher in cap-and-trade.
• To see the profit expression.
Observe that:
2aiE[Πc − Πt] = E[min{pc(θ), pc(θi)}2]− (V (pt) +E[pt]2 − 2E[pt]tipi + t2ipi2)
= E[min{pc(θ), pc(θi)}2]− (V (pt) + (E[p]− tipi)2)
= E[min{pc(θ), pc(θi)}2]− (V (pt) +E[min{pc(θ), pc(θi)}]2)
= V (min{pc(θ), pc(θi)})− V (pt)
Where we’ve used that both policies induce the same expected price, as well as the
characterizing equation for permits. Under the assumptions for the tax, we can calcu-
late the variance for the price under tax.
V (pt) =
V (θ)
(A+
∑n
i=1
1
ai
)2
.
Then the expression becomes:
2aiE[Πc − Πt] = V (min{pc(θ), pc(θi)})− V (θ)
(A+
∑n
i=1
1
ai
)2
.
Thus,
∆i =
1
2ai
(V (min{pc(θ), pc(θi)})− V (θ)
(A+
∑n
i=1
1
ai
)2
).
• Let i be the producer with the worst technology, i.e. highest ti. As a result of Lemma
3.A.2 from Proposition 3.3.2, the producer with the worst technology is the first pro-
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ducer to reach its cap. Therefore using the market equilibrium equation:
n∑
j=1
sj(p) = D(p, θ)
We find:
min{pc(θ), pc(θi)} = 1
(A+
∑n
i=1
1
ai
)
(B + min{θ, θi})
Thus,
∆i =
1
2ai(A+
∑n
i=1
1
ai
)2
(V (min{θ, θi})− V (θ))
Similarly, In the case of symmetric suppliers, we find:
∆i =
1
2a(A+ n
a
)2
(V (min{θ, θ∗})− V (θ)) ∀i
All that remains to prove is that:
V (minX, c) ≤ V (X)
Where X is a random variable of zero mean and c a constant.
We start by stating,
min{X, c}+ max{X, c} = X + c. (3.12)
This means that the variance satisfies:
V (min{X, c}) + V (max{X, c}) + 2(E[min{X, c}max{X, c}]−E[min{X, c}]E[max{X, c}]) = V (X)
Rearranging the terms, and using that E[min{X, c}max{X, c}] = cE[X] = 0, we find:
V (min{X, c})− V (X) = −V (max{X, c}) + 2E[min{X, c}]E[max{X, c}]
We want to prove that the right hand side is negative. To do this, we separate in two
cases, positive c and negative c. If c ≥ 0, we take expected value in Equation (3.12),
and find:
E[max{X, c}] = c−E[min{X, c}].
Therefore,
E[min{X, c}]E[max{X, c}] = cE[min{X, c}]−E[min{X, c}]2
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Given the fact that min{X, c} ≤ X, we know that E[min{X, c}] ≤ 0, proving that the
right hand side is negative.
If c < 0, following the same reasoning in Equation (3.12), we obtain,
E[min{X, c}] = c−E[max{X, c}].
Therefore,
E[min{X, c}]E[max{X, c}] = cE[max{X, c}]−E[max{X, c}]2
Given that max{X, c} ≥ X, we know that E[max{X, c}] ≥ 0, and therefore:
cE[max{X, c}] ≤ 0.
Proving the result for the case c < 0.
3.A.5 Proposition 3.3.3
The assumption that producers produce almost surely can be guaranteeing by the condition
θ0 ≥ ((A+
∑n
i=1
1
ai
) max
j=1,...,n
{tj} −
∑n
i=1 ti
1
ai
)ρ−B
• Following a similar methodology as in the cap regulation case, the optimization problem
faced by the producers is:
sbi(p) ∈ arg max
0≤q≤xi
ti
{pq − ci(q) + ρ(xi − tiq)}.
Under our assumptions in cost structure this yields:
sbi(p) = min{
p− ρti
ai
,
xi
ti
}.
• To choose the optimal xi we do a change of variable just as in the cap regulation case,
and instead search for θi such that:
sbi(p) = min{
p(θ)− ρti
ai
,
p(θi)− ρti
ai
}.
Where p represents the price as a function of uncertainty using the optimal values of
(θi)
n
i=1.
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The optimal value of θi satisfies:
θi ∈ argmax
θi
E[p(θ)
min{p(θ), p(θi)} − ρti
ai
−1
2
ai(
min{p(θ), p(θi)} − ρti
ai
)2−ρtimin{p(θ), p(θi)} − ρti
ai
)]+
(ρ− pi)ti p(θi)− ρti
ai
.
The first order condition for θi yields:
E[(p(θ)− p(θi))δ(θ > θi)] = (pi − ρ)ti.
• Given a realization θ, the profit obtained by selling permits can be written as:
ρ
ti
ai
(p(θi)−min{p(θ), p(θi)})
Similarly the profit obtained by production is:
(ρti + p(θ)− 1
2
min{p(θ), p(θi)})min{p(θ), p(θi)} − ρti
ai
From the expressions we can see that the revenue from selling permits decreases as θ
increases, and the reverse is true for the profits from production.
• The convexity of p is obtained just as in Proposition 3.3.2. To see this, note that,
n∑
i=1
min{p(θ), p(θi)} = D(p(θ), θ) + ρ
n∑
i=1
ti
ai
.
Hence the market equilibrium equation is just a shift from the structure from cap
regulation, and hence convexity is preserved.
• Similar to Proposition 3.3.2, we now prove that θi is increasing in ρ. Notice that
(pi − ρ)(ti−1 − ti) = E[(p(θ)− p(θi))δ(θ ∈ (θi−1, θi])] + (p(θi)− p(θi−1))E[δ(θ > θi−1)]
The market equilibrium equation establishes that p(θ) is linear for θ ∈ [θi−1, θi] with
slope νi, therefore,
pi(ti−1 − ti)
νi
= E[(θ − θi−1)δ(θ ≥ θi−1)]− E[(θ − θi)δ(θ ≥ θi)]
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Hence by denoting G(q) = E[(θ− q)δ(θ ≥ q)], we can generate a recursion and obtain:
G(θi) =
n+1∑
j=i+1
(pi − ρ)(tj−1 − tj)
νj
Given that G is a decreasing function, the larger the value of ρ, the larger the value of
θi.
To prove the monotonicity of the total amount of permits we proceed as in Proposition
3.3.2. First, by considering the market equilibrium equation for θ1, ..., θn we obtain n
equations,
n∑
i=1
min{p(θj), p(θi)} − ρti
ai
= B − Ap(θj) + θj j = 1, ..., n.
Which, following the notation and definitions used in the proof of Proposition 3.3.2,
can be rewritten into,
M~p = (B + ρ
n∑
i=1
ti
ai
)~1+ ~θ.
Therefore,
~t′D−1~p = (B + ρ
n∑
i=1
ti
ai
)~t′(MD)−1~1+ ~t′(MD)−1~θ
n∑
i=1
xi = ~t
′D−1~p−ρ ~t′D−1t = B~t′(MD)−1~1+~t′(MD)−1~θ+ρ(1′D−1~t~t′(MD)−1~1− ~t′D−1t)
n∑
i=1
xi = B~t
′(MD)−11+ ~t′(MD)−1(~θ + ρ(11′ − (MD))D−1~t)
In Proposition 3.3.2, we proved that t′(MD)−1 ≥ 0. By proving that ~θ + ρ(11′ −
(MD))D−1~t is increasing in ρ, we finish proving the monotonicity of the permits pur-
chased. We do this in two steps: first we find d
dρ
θi and then we conclude the result.
We know,
θi = G
−1((pi − ρ)
n+1∑
j=i+1
(tj−1 − tj)
νj
)
Using the inverse function theorem, we have:
d
dρ
θi = −
∑n+1
j=i+1
(tj−1−tj)
νj
G′((pi − ρ)∑n+1j=i+1 (tj−1−tj)νj ) .
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Given that G(q) = E[(θ − q)δ(θ ≥ q)], it is easy to show:
G′(q) = −Fθ(q)
Let αi(ρ) =
1
Fθ((pi−ρ)
∑n+1
j=i+1
(tj−1−tj)
νj
)
> 1.
Then we have:
d
dρ
n∑
i=1
xi = t
′(MD)−1z
Where,
zi = αi(ρ)
n+1∑
j=i+1
(tj−1 − tj)
νj
+
n∑
l=1
(11′ −MD)il tl
al
= αi(ρ)
n+1∑
j=i+1
(tj−1 − tj)
νj
+ (1− ai
νi
)
ti
ai
+
n∑
l>i
tl
al
= αi(ρ)
n+1∑
j=i+1
(tj−1 − tj)
νj
− ti(A+
n∑
j=i
1
aj
) +
n∑
l≥i
tl
al
= αi(ρ)
n+1∑
j=i+1
(tj−1 − tj)
νj
− tiA+
n∑
l≥i
tl − ti
al
= αi(ρ)
n+1∑
l>i
(tl−1 − tl)(A+
n∑
j=l
1
aj
)− tiA+
n∑
l>i
tl − ti
al
= αi(ρ)Ati + αi(ρ)
n+1∑
l>i
(tl−1 − tl)
al
+ αi(ρ)
n+1∑
l>i
n∑
j>l
(tl−1 − tl) 1
aj
− tiA+
n∑
l>i
tl − ti
al
= Ati(αi(ρ)− 1) + αi(ρ)
n+1∑
l>i
(tl−1 − ti + ti − tl)
al
+ αi(ρ)
n+1∑
l>i
n∑
j>l
(tl−1 − tl) 1
aj
+
n∑
l>i
tl − ti
al
= Ati(αi(ρ)− 1) + αi(ρ)
n+1∑
l>i
tl−1 − ti
al
+ αi(ρ)
n+1∑
l>i
n∑
j>l
(tl−1 − tl) 1
aj
+ (αi(ρ)− 1)
n∑
l>i
ti − tl
al
Given that all the terms are positive we conclude the result.
• The rest of the expressions are derived analogous to Proposition 3.3.2.
3.A.6 Proposition 3.4.1
Following the analysis from Klemperer and Meyer (1989), in order for producer to decide
on their supply functions, it solves the supply function equilibrium problem. That is the
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solution satisfies:
max
p≥0
(p− tiξ)(D(p, θ)−
∑
j 6=i
sj(p))− 1
2
ai(D(p, θ)−
∑
j 6=i
sj(p))
2
The first order conditions to this problem are:
si(p)− (p− tiξ − aisi(p))(A+
∑
j 6=i
s′j(p)) = 0
We propose a solution of the form: si(p) = ci(p − tiξ). Then we have ci should satisfy the
system:
ci
(1− aici) = (A+
∑
j 6=i
cj) ∀i
In order to find a solution to the system, we can sum the equations to obtain the relation:
n∑
i=1
ci
(1− aici) − (n− 1)ci = nA
We propose a solution such that:
ci
(1− aici) − (n− 1)ci = A ∀i
This yields a quadratic equation for ci. The positive solution to this system is bi(n), as
defined in Definition 3.4.1.
In Klemperer and Meyer (1989), establishes that if the solution to the quadratic problem
we showed, exists then it’s the solution to the supply function equilibrium. Hence we derived:
si(p) = bi(n)(p− tiξ)
Under this conditions following the algebra as in Proposition 3.3.1, we can find the
expected price:
E[p] =
B + ξ
∑n
i=1 tibi(n)
A+
∑n
i=1 bi(n)
The expected emissions:
E[e] =
n∑
i=1
tibi(n)(E[p]− tiξ)
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expected revenue collected by the regulator:
E[R] = ξE(e).
The expected profit for the regulator:
E[Πi] = bi(n)(1− 1
2
aibi(n))E[(p(θ)− tiξ)2].
Throughout the paper we assume producers are active for all uncertainties. This is
equivalent to adding the additional constraint in θ:
p(θ) =
(B + θ + ξ
∑n
i=1 tibi(n))
A+
∑n
i=1 bi(n)
≥ min
j
{tj}ξ
3.A.7 Proposition 3.4.2
In this setting the value of θ as well as xi are known when trading occurs. In order to
determine the result from trading, we need to find the value to two parameters: si(p) the
amount produced and τi the permits purchased (sold if the value is negative).
When trading occurs each producer faces the following optimization problem:
max
si(p)≥0
tisi(p)≤xi+τi
psi(p)− 1
2
aisi(p)
2 − ρτi.
Subject to the market clearing condition:
n∑
i=1
τi = 0. (3.13)
Given that :
n∑
i=1
si(p) = B − Ap+ θ (3.14)
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We can replace the price in the optimization problem, the first order conditions yield:
si(p)− {p− aisi(p)− λiti}(A+
∑
j 6=i
s′j(p)) = 0
ρ− λi = 0
si(p)µi = 0
λi(τi + xi − tisi(p)) = 0
si(p) ≥ 0
µi ≥ 0
λi ≥ 0
tisi(p)− τi ≤ xi
We restrict ourselves to the cases when ρ the trading price is positive almost surely, as well
as the production from producers. We later characterize the range of θ that is consistent
with our assumptions. This simplification implies λi = ρ and µi = 0.
Hence the system then becomes:
si(p)− {p− aisi(p)− ρti}(A+
∑
j 6=i
s′j(p)) = 0
tisi(p)− τi = xi
We proceed as in Proposition 3.4.1 and propose a solution si(p(θ)) = ci(p(θ) − ρ(θ)ti). In
this case the equation we obtain for ci is the same as in Proposition 3.4.1, and hence the
appropriate value for ci is bi(n). Note that ρ is now a random variable, function of the
consumer price p(θ), defined by:
ρ(θ) =
tibi(n)p(θ)−
∑n
i=1 xi∑n
i=1 t
2
i bi(n)
• One can show using (3.14), that:
E[p(θ)] =
B +E[ρ(θ)]
n∑
i=1
tibi(n)
A+
n∑
i=1
bi(n)
.
ρ(θ) ≥ 0
Resembling previous results.
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• Using (3.13), we find:
n∑
i=1
tibi(n)(E[p]−E[ρ]ti) =
n∑
i=1
xi.
Thus we have can determine the expected price, and the expected market trading price
in terms of
∑n
i=1 xi, by solving these two equations.
• In order to characterize the permits bought, once can find the producer’s profits are:
E[Πi] = E[bi(n)(p(θ)− ρ(θ)ti)2(1− 1
2
aibi(n)) + ρ(θ)xi]− pixi
Under this assumption an expression characterizing the optimal value of xi may be
obtained with some algebra.
• Lastly, to characterize the bounds for θ, we want to find xi, the amount of permits
purchased. As established before xi comes from a maximization problem. In this
scenario, the maximization problem is:
max
xi≥0
E[(1− aibi(n)
2
)bi(n)(p(θ)− tiρ(θ))2 + ρ(θ)xi]− pixi.
To find the first order condition, we can use the equations previously developed to
observe that the dependency of ρ and p on xi is linear. In fact, it has the same slope
for all i. Hence:
∂
∂xi
E[ρ(θ)] = ρ′ ∀i
∂
∂xi
E[p(θ)] = p′ ∀i
Moreover to find the values of ρ′ and p′ we solve the system of equations:
n∑
i=1
tibi(n)(p
′ − ρ′ti) = 1.
n∑
i=1
bi(n)(p
′ − ρ′ti) = −Ap′.
And thus, we see they do not depend on the value of pi. After observing this we can
determine the first order conditions to the maximization problem:
2(1− aibi(n)
2
)(p′ − tiρ′)(E[p(θ)]− tiE[ρ(θ)])bi(n) +E[ρ(θ)] + x∗i ρ′ = pi (3.15)
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This condition depends on the expected price and the expected trading price, ρ, hence
it depends on the other xj, j 6= i. Observe that the interchange between expected
value and derivatives is justified when θ has a bounded range.
In order to obtain the optimal amount of permits that each producer purchases, we
first determine ρ′ and p′, as they do not depend on pi or xi, and then solve the following
system of equations in the variables E(p),E(ρ) and {xi}ni=1:
2(1− aibi(n)
2
)(p′ − tiρ′)bi(n)(E[p]− tiE[ρ]) +E[ρ] + x∗i ρ′ = pi ∀i
n∑
i=1
tibi(n)(E[p]−E[ρ]ti) =
n∑
i=1
x∗i
n∑
i=1
bi(n)(E[p]−E[ρ]ti) = B − AE[p].
Once the solution to the system of linear equations is established, one can characterize
the ranges for θ by imposing, si(p), ρ(θ) ≥ 0.
Observe that if we are only concerned with the expected price and the total amount
of permits purchased, we can reduce the problem to two variables and two equations
as follow:
n∑
i=1
{2(1− aibi
2
)(p′ − ρ′ti) + ρ′ti}bi(E[p]− tiE[ρ]) = n(pi −E[ρ])
n∑
i=1
bi(E[p]−E[ρ]ti) = B − AE[p].
Here we summed the first n equations of the previous system, and replace the value
for the sum of the permits using the second equation of the previous system.
3.B Counterexamples
Consider a random variable θ uniformly distributed in the interval [−f, f ], B, A, t2, t1, a2,
a1 and pi are parameters. Consider t2 < t1.
Then if we choose the parameters such that both producers purchase permits, we would
have:
θ1 = f − 2
√
fpi((t2 − t1)(A+ 1
a2
) + t2,
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θ2 = f − 2
√
fpit2.
Price as a random variable for quantities regulation is:
p(θ) =

B+θ
(A+ 1
a1
+ 1
a2
)
θ ∈ [−f, θ1)
(θ−θ1)
A+ 1
a2
+ B+θ1
(A+ 1
a1
+ 1
a2
)
θ ∈ [θ1, θ2)
θ−θ2
A
+ (θ2−θ1)
A+ 1
a2
B+θ1
(A+ 1
a1
+ 1
a2
)
θ ∈ [θ2, f ]
The expected profits under permit regulation are :
1
2a1
E[min{p(θ), p(θ1)}2] = 1
4a1f(A+
∑2
i=1
1
ai
)2
(
(B + θ1)
3
3
− (B − f)
3
3
+ (B + θ1)
2(f − θ1))
1
2a2
E[min{p(θ), p(θ2)}2] = 1
4a2f
{ 1
(A+
∑2
i=1
1
ai
)2
(
(B + θ1)
3
3
− (B − f)
3
3
) + (
(θ2 − θ1)
A+ 1
a2
+
B + θ1
(A+ 1
a1
+ 1
a2
)
)2(f − θ2)) +
A+ 1
a2
3
((
(θ2 − θ1)
A+ 1
a2
+
B + θ1
(A+ 1
a1
+ 1
a2
)
)3 − ( B + θ1
(A+ 1
a1
+ 1
a2
)
)3)}.
Price as a random variable for tax regulation is:
p(θ) =
B + θ + pi
∑2
i=1
ti
ai
A+
∑2
i=1
1
ai
The expected profits under tax regulation are:
1
2a2
E[(p(θ)−t2ξ)2] = 1
12fa2(A+
∑2
i=1
1
ai
)2
{(B+f+pi(
2∑
i=1
ti − t2
ai
−t2A))3−(B−f+pi(
2∑
i=1
ti − t2
ai
−t2A))3}.
1
2a1
E[(p(θ)−t1ξ)2] = 1
12fa1(A+
∑2
i=1
1
ai
)2
{(B+f+pi(
2∑
i=1
ti − t1
ai
−t1A))3−(B−f+pi(
2∑
i=1
ti − t1
ai
−t1A))3}.
All our figures have in common B = 100, A = 1 By choosing B = 100, A = 1, f = 50
and maximum pi = 4.
• In Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2, the parameters chosen were t1 = 1, t2 = 0.5, a1 = 1.6
and a2 = 2. These parameters guarantee that both producers have decreasing profits
as the tax rate/permit price increases.
80
• In Figure 3-3, the parameters chosen were t1 = 1, t2 = 0.1, a1 = 0.2 and a2 = 2.
These parameters guarantee that the producer 2 receives increasing profits under both
regulations. The producer experiences higher profits under cap regulation.
• Below, in Figure 3-5, the parameters chosen were t1 = 1, t2 = 0.1, a1 = 0.2 and a2 = 2.
These parameters guarantee that the producer 2 receives increasing profits under both
regulations. For low permit prices the producer experiences higher profits under cap
regulation, but after a certain value a tax policy delivers higher profits.
• Below, in Figure 3-6, the parameters chosen were t1 = 16, t2 = 3, a1 = 4 and a2 = 6.
These parameters guarantee that the producer 2 receives increasing profits under tax
regulation, and decreasing profits under cap regulation.
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Figure 3-5: Producer 2 profits crossing each other.
Figure 3-6: Producer 2 profits increasing in tax and decreasing in permit price.
3.B.1 Matlab Code
Below is the code used to generate the graphics in Matlab.
82
function [c,t]=checkProfits()
m=2;
%both decreasing
%t=[1;0.5];
%c=[0.8;1];
%Disjoint
%t=[16; 3];
%c=[2; 3];
%Both increasing
%t=[1;0.1];
%c=[0.1; 1];
%Cross
%t=[15;2];
%c=[2; 2];
a=2*c;
cond=sum(t./a)*ones(m,1)-t*sum(1./a)-t;
range=0.1:0.05:4;
PT=zeros(m,length(range));
PCT=zeros(m,length(range));
i=1;
for tt=range
P=theoProfits(tt);
PT(:,i)=P(:,2);
PCT(:,i)=P(:,1);
i=i+1;
end
plot(range,PT(2,:),’x’,range,PCT(2,:),’o’)
title(’Profits vs tax/permit price (clean technology)’)
legend(’Tax regulation’,’Cap regulation’)
xlabel(’Tax/Permit Price’)
ylabel(’Profits’)
function P=theoProfits(tx)
B=100;
f=50;
A=1;
tp=zeros(m,1);
cp=zeros(m,1);
for j=1:m
tp(j)=(1/(2*a(j)))*(1/(6*f*(A+sum(1./a))^2))*((B+f+tx*(cond(j)))^3-(B-f+tx*(cond(j)))^3);
end
tth=[f-2*sqrt(f*tx*((t(1)-t(2))*(1+1/a(2))+t(2))) ;f-2*sqrt(f*tx*t(2))];
cp(2)=(1/(2*a(2)))*(1/(2*f))*((1/(A+sum(1./a))^2)*( ((B+tth(1))^3)/3 - ((B-f)^3)/3 )
+((tth(2)-tth(1))/(A+1/a(2)) + (B+tth(1))/(A+sum(1./a)))^2*(f-tth(2))
+((A+1/a(2))/3)*( ( (tth(2)-tth(1))/(A+1/a(2))
+ (B+tth(1))/(A+sum(1./a)) )^3 - ( (B+tth(1))/(A+sum(1./a)) )^3 ) );
cp(1)=(1/(2*a(1)))*(1/(2*f*(A+sum(1./a))^2))*( ((B+tth(1))^3)/3 -((B-f)^3)/3
83
+(f-tth(1))*(B+tth(1))^2);
P=[cp tp];
end
end
3.C Lower bound for profits in the case of Cap regu-
lation
From Proposition 3.3.2, the profits for cap regulation for producer i are given by,
E[Πi] =
1
2ai
E[min{p(θ), p(θi)}2].
Using Jensen’s inequality we can obtain a lower bound:
E[Πi] ≥ 1
2ai
E[min{p(θ), p(θi)}]2
=
1
2ai
(E[p]− piti)2
=
1
2ai(A+
∑n
j=1
1
aj
)2
(B + pi(
n∑
j=1
tj − ti
aj
− Ati))2
Taking derivatives it can be verified that the lower bound is increasing in pi if and only if∑n
j=1
tj−ti
aj
> Ati.
3.D Existence and uniqueness in the unregulated frame-
work
We prove this in a more general framework where the cost is strictly convex and lim
q→+∞
ci(q) =
+∞, additionally demand is decreasing in p.
Under this assumptions, there is a unique optimal solution to the optimization problem
defining si(p), and hence it is well defined. Moreover, since the objective function defining
si(p) is super modular in p and q and the set {(p, q) : q ≥ 0, p ≥ 0} is a lattice, si(p) is
increasing in p.
Let f(p) = D(p)−
n∑
i=1
si(p), which given the assumptions is a decreasing function. f(0) =
D(0) > 0, plus the monotonicity of sj, lim
p→+∞
f(p) < 0. Hence there exists a pM such that
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f(pM) < 0. Then using the intermediate value theorem we have the existence of p∗ the
market equilibrium. Using the strict monotonicity of f , uniqueness follows.
3.E Intuition on Theorem 3.3.2
Next, we provide some intuition on why the permit price has to be equal to the tax rate in
order to compare regulations. Consider the problem:
min
x∈X
f(x)
s.t. Ax ≤ b
Where we are minimizing an objective function, f , subject to some resource constraints.
For example, think about x as production, f to be minus the social welfare, X to include all
technical constraints and Ax ≤ b represent emission limits. This is the problem the central
planner is interested in solving. Lagrangean duality, under proper assumptions, establishes
the absence of a duality gap as well as existence of a dual multiplier, λ, such that the optimal
value to the problem coincides with the optimal value to the relaxed problem, therefore,
min
x∈X,Ax≤b
f(x) = min
x∈X
{f(x) + λ′(b− Ax)}.
To see the connection with our results, we rewrite the equality as:
min
x∈X,Ax≤b
{f(x)} − λ′b = min
x∈X
{f(x)− λ′(Ax)}.
The left hand side mimics a situation where resources are purchased prior to production
at a price λ, while the right hand side mimics the situation where resources are purchased
in conjunction with production at a price λ. Lagrangean duality states that when using the
appropriate value of λ the production objective can be achieved by either system.
3.F Numerical results for cap-and-trade
From Appendix 3.A.7, we can find ρ′, p′ by solving:
n∑
i=1
tibi(n)(p
′ − ρ′ti) = 1.
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n∑
i=1
bi(n)(p
′ − ρ′ti) = −Ap′.
Once we have these values, we solve the following system of equations:
2(1− aibi(n)
2
)(p′ − tiρ′)bi(n)(E[p]− tiE[ρ]) +E[ρ] + x∗i ρ′ = pi ∀i
n∑
i=1
tibi(n)(E[p]−E[ρ]ti) =
n∑
i=1
x∗i
n∑
i=1
bi(n)(E[p]−E[ρ]ti) = B − AE[p].
Thus, obtaining the values for E[p],E[ρ] and {xi}ni=1. Given these values average emissions
is,
∑n
i=1 xi, and the revenue collected by the central planner is pi
∑n
i=1 xi.
The case of tax is completely analogous to Appendix 3.B.
The parameters used in Figure 3-4 are:
• a = 1, 1.2, 1.8, 2.2.
• t = 2, 1.5, 1, 0.8.
• D(p, θ) = 100− p+ θ.
• θ ∼ Uniform[−20, 20].
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Chapter 4
Supply Chain Impact Of Labeling
Decisions
4.1 Introduction
Consumers are increasingly using dimensions beyond price to make purchasing decisions of
goods and services. For example, diverse quality measures such as CO2 emissions and nutri-
tional values of goods can be significant sources of competitive advantage for products and
services, and poor performance in these dimensions can lead to potential loss of customers
and profitability. Although certain types products’ quality (e.g., products that are credence
goods ) cannot be easily observed by consumers, firms are increasingly making quality more
discernible through quality labels in order to differentiate their products and inform con-
sumers’ purchasing decisions. Examples of carbon labels come in different contexts, such
as environmental (e.g., the Carbon Trust’s carbon footprint labels, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency’s Energy Star ratings for electrical appliances, and the Forest Steward-
ship Council (FSC) certified labels for responsibly sourced timber), health (e.g., nutritional
labels), and safety (e.g., Nike’s Code of Conduct).
In this chapter, we investigate the impact the labeling decision has on the supply chain.
Because labeling makes previously unobservable characteristics of products visible to con-
sumers, there are potential benefits in terms of increased sales to be obtained from labeling,
independent of which party in the supply chain leads the initiative to label the products.
An increase in potential sales generates additional revenue for the retailer, while at the same
time it produces an increase in the orders the supplier receives from the retailer. Given that
both parties may benefit from labeling, the design of an appropriate supply-chain contract
that maximizes potential benefit is of the essence. Our research focuses on whether the
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quality described in the label (e.g., energy consumption, CO2 emissions, or nutritional facts)
should be decided by the supplier or imposed by the retailer. In particular, the question we
are looking to analyze is the following: In an environment where demand is affected by a
quality measure, which party should decide on the quality level to be labeled: the supplier or
the retailer? What kind of contracts are able to achieve the levels and profits of a vertically
integrated supply chain?
For this purpose, we use a stylized model to represent the strategic interaction between
a retailer and a supplier. The supplier produces goods and decides the wholesale price at
which it supplies its goods to the retailer. The supplier’s production cost is increasing in
the quality of the product. The retailer is a price-setter facing one-period uncertain demand
which is decreasing in retail price and increasing in the supplier’s quality level. The retailer
chooses retail price as well as the stocking quantity (amount purchased from the supplier)
prior to realization of demand. We assume that unsatisfied demand over the period is filled
with an emergency order from an alternative source. The retailer faces an expedite cost for
demand shortage, and a salvage/disposal cost for additional leftover units. Note that the
supplier and the retailer bear different sets of costs: the supplier bears the cost of quality
decisions, whereas the retailer faces the risk of uncertain demand.
We analyze decisions about the optimal quality of a product made under three models
that reflect different decision-making parties. We begin by considering a vertically integrated
supply chain making decisions on both the quality level and the retail price. This serves as
a benchmark (B) model by giving the maximum amount of profits that can be obtained in
the supply chain. Then, we consider two different models to compare with the benchmark:
the Supplier-Choice (SC) model, and the Retailer-Choice (RC) model. It is natural for the
supplier to make a decision about the quality level of its product; the SC model, in which
the supplier decides the product’s quality level as well as its wholesale price to the retailer,
reflects this reality. However, retailers have more direct contact with the consumers, and we
also consider the possibility of a retailer to be influential enough such that it can suggest
a quality level to the supplier. This interaction is captured in our RC model, in which the
retailer enforces a quality level on the supplier’s product, and the supplier then decides the
wholesale price to the retailer.
We show that when market demand is quasilinear and deterministic, the SC, RC, and B
models yield identical optimal quality levels. We also show that the optimal quality levels
under the SC and the RC models that are identical under deterministic demand can differ in
the presence of demand uncertainty. We characterize two different contracts coordinating the
supply chain. These contracts coordinate the supply chain independent of assumptions on
demand or costs. In the case of linear demand we characterize the optimal solution for each
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of the models, as well as finding a system of ordinary differential equations characterizing
the effect of demand variance. In the majority of realistic scenarios, the RC model leads to
higher chosen quality levels than the SC model; thus, the retailer faces reduction in payoff
when leaving quality level decisions to the supplier.
In Chapter 4 of Jira (2013), this model is analyzed under the additional assumption of
uniformly distributed demand. This Chapter extends the model in order to extend results
for general distributions of demand.
4.2 Literature Review
Our work builds upon and contributes to several streams of literature that explore addi-
tional product attributes beyond price that are desirable to end customers but are costly to
provide. In particular, our work contributes to three streams of literature: (1) the literature
on vertical differentiation of products and services, especially those that contain interactions
between supply chain members, (2) the inventory management literature that feature deci-
sion choices among members of the supply chain, such as the literature on Vendor-Managed
Inventory, and (3) the literature on the interaction between product quality and supply chain
performance.
There is a large body of work in economics and operations management on vertical
differentiation models, in which a firm’s products and services compete on both price and
another aspect beyond price (“quality”) that is desirable to consumers. A higher level of
quality increases consumer demand, but costs more for a firm to provide. Examples of these
studies include various models of duopolistic price and quality competition as multistage
games in which quality and price are chosen in different stages (Choi and Shin, 1992; Wauthy,
1996; Moorthy, 1988; Motta, 1993; Lehmann-Grube, 1997; Wang, 2003). Within this stream
of literature, there are studies pertaining to specific contexts of quality, such as environmental
management (e.g., Amacher et al., 2004; Conrad, 2005; Rodriguez-Ibeas, 2007; Craig, 2012),
advertising budget (e.g., Dorfman and Steiner, 1954), and production (e.g., Banker et al.,
1998; Chambers et al., 2006; Bernstein and Federgruen, 2004). These streams of research,
like ours, model consumer demand as linearly decreasing in price and increasing in quality,
and model production cost as increasing in quality. However, these streams of research differ
from ours in several ways. Firstly, in these studies, both price and quality decisions are made
by one firm. As such, these studies do not touch upon supply chain interactions between the
supplier and the retailer. Secondly, with the exception of Raz et al. (2012) and Bernstein
and Federgruen (2004), these studies do not consider stochasticity in consumer demand,
like ours does. Thirdly, these studies focus almost exclusively on horizontal duopolistic or
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oligopolistic competition between firms, which is not the focus of our work.
Unlike the above studies, which do not contain a supply chain interaction, another body of
work focuses on the interaction between a supplier and the retailer about price and “quality”
decisions. In operations management, there are various streams of such literature. One
example is the body of work about price and service competition (e.g., Desiraju and Moorthy,
1997; Tsay and Agrawal, 2000; Cachon and Harker, 2002; Boyaci and Gallego, 2004; Bernstein
and Federgruen, 2007; Allon and Federgruen, 2009; Krishnan and Winter, 2010). Like our
study, many of these studies consider the optimal decisions as well as contractual alignments
associated with the interaction between a retailer and a supplier facing stochastic consumer
demand. However, the quality (i.e., service) levels are driven by the retailer’s actions, whereas
the quality levels in our model are the property of the supplier’s products and thus driven by
the supplier’s production technologies. These studies also focus on the horizontal competition
between retailers, which is not the focus of our analysis. Another stream of work is on price
and lead time decisions (e.g., Liu et al. 2007, Pekgun et al. 2008, Ha et al. 2010, Hua
et al. 2010). While these studies, like ours, explore the difference between the centralized
versus decentralized decision-making structures for price and quality, the first three studies
do not consider the possibility that the retailer can make decisions on quality as our work
does, while the last study only focuses on deterministic demand. Outside of operations
management, similar models exist in various contexts such as private labels, Gomez-Arias
and Bello-Acebron (2008) and environmental labels Craig (2012). These studies have two
main differences from our work: (1) quality is determined exogenously and thus is not part
of the suppliers’ or the retailers’ decisions, and (2) unlike our models, which focus on who
chooses the level of quality, these models focus on the competition between the suppliers or
the supply chains.
Our work is also related to the literature on Vendor Managed Inventory (e.g., Choi et
al. 2004, Aviv 2002, Kim 2008, Mishra and Raghunathan 2004, Nagarajan and Rajagopalan
2008, and Kraiselburd et al. 2004) because of the similar focus on choices made by retailers
versus suppliers. However, in this stream of literature, the choice is on stocking quantity
decisions rather than quality, and the only “quality” dimension mentioned is effort, which is
not contractible and not observable. More generally, because we explicitly model inventory
decisions in the supply chain, our work also extends the operations and inventory manage-
ment literature that focuses on the integration of pricing and inventory (e.g., Simchi-Levi
et al., 2005).
Lastly, there exists an extensive literature on quality management in the supply chain.
However, the focuses of these papers are different from ours in a significant way. For exam-
ple, Baiman, Fisher, Rajan (2000) focused on prevention and appraisal costs for defective
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products and contractual terms in the face of moral hazard. Whang et al (2006) examine
the buyers problem of inducing the suppliers quality effort through appraisal and certifica-
tion. Gans (2002) focused on customer choice in response to random variation in quality.
Hosanagar et al (2005) focuses on the decision of quality of service and price in relations
to the cache sizes. Zhu et al (2007) models quality at the unit product level and considers
choices of investing in quality-improvement efforts from both the retailer and the supplier.
Rayniers and Tapiero (1995) model the effect of contract parameters such as price rebates
and after-sales warranty costs on the choice of quality by a supplier, the inspection policy of
a producer, and the resulting end product quality.
4.3 Model
We consider a sequential two-stage supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer,
facing customer demand. The supplier supplies good to the retailer under a wholesale price
contract in which the wholesale price is specified by the supplier. The supplier’s goods
have associated with it a quality level (e.g., carbon emissions) which is determined by the
supplier’s production process. The risk-neutral retailer has to decide on its stock level and
the selling price of a single product. Demand is stochastic, and depends on the selling price
and a quality parameter. As expected, the supplier anticipates the reaction of the retailer
and takes it into account when deciding on the quality level and wholesale price.
The setting in this model is as follows. Demand is stochastic and endogenously deter-
mined. In particular, for a given selling price p, and a given quality level x, demand has the
following form.
D(p, x, ε) = D(p, x) + ε,
where ε is a continuous random variable with E[ε] = 0, E[ε2] = σ2, probability density
function f and cumulative distribution function F . In the analysis under deterministic
demand, we consider a quasilinear demand, D(p, x) = −bp+X(x), where b > 0 and X is a
continuously differentiable function. In the analysis under stochastic demand, we consider
a linear demand D(p, x) = A − bp + rx, where A, b and r are positive coefficients. An
implicit assumption is that realized demand D(p, x, ε) is always non negative, which imposes
conditions on the selling price, quality parameter and random variable.
The retailer places an order from the supplier before realization of demand, and sells the
product to its customers at a unit price p. The unit ordering cost is the wholesale price
from the supplier w, and unsatisfied demand is filled with an emergency order. Let h(y) be
the inventory holding/disposal cost or the emergency ordering cost when the inventory level
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after satisfying demand is y. We assume h(y) of the following form.
h(y) = h+ max{y, 0}+ h−max{−y, 0},
where h+ is the unit inventory holding/disposal cost if h+ is nonnegative or the unit salvage
value if it is negative, and h− is the unit cost for the emergency order. Additionally, we
require h(y) to be convex, and zero to be a minimizer of wy + h(y), or equivalently,
h− ≥ w ≥ max{0,−h+},
namely, the salvage value is no more than the wholesale cost from the supplier, which in
turn is no more than the unit cost of an emergency order. These assumptions guarantee
that production of the units is more profitable than expediting all units, or over purchasing
to cover demand almost surely. For a given stock level y and a selling price p, the expected
profit of the retailer has the following form.
Πr = E[pD(p, x, ε)− wy − h(y −D(p, x, ε))].
The supplier receives orders from the retailer before realization of demand. The wholesale
price the supplier specifies to the retailer is w, and the unit production cost is c(x). We
assume unit production cost to be increasing in the quality level x. For a given order
quantity y, wholesale price w and quality level x, the profit for the supplier has the following
form.
Πs = (w − c(x))y.
Before proceeding to establish the maximization problem that each of the parties faces, we
differentiate between three different models, depending on the interaction between supplier
and retailer.
• Supplier-choice model : The supplier and the retailer act as a two-stage supply chain.
The supplier decides on the quality level, x.
• Retailer-choice model : The supplier and the retailer act as a two-stage supply chain.
The retailer decides on the quality level, x.
• Integrated model : The retailer and the supplier act as a vertically integrated supply
chain.
In the supplier-choice model, the supplier chooses the quality level to be used. This
model is the most natural, as the supplier experiences the cost of increasing quality. In this
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model, a two-stage Stackleberg game determines the optimal level of quality x. In the second
stage, the maximization problem faced by the retailer is the following.
max
p,y≥0
E[pD(p, x, ε)− wy − h(y −D(p, x, ε))]. (4.1)
In the first stage, the supplier anticipates the behavior of the retailer when setting the
wholesale price and quality level. The objective of the supplier is to maximize its own profit,
which can be written as a function of the ordering quantity of the retailer, y(w, p).
max
w≥0
x∈R
(w − c(x))y(w, x). (4.2)
By contrast, in the retailer-choice model, the retailer enforces a quality level on the
retailer. This model is more natural in settings where the retailer has bargaining power
over the supplier, or is more acquainted with customer demand. In this model, a three
stage Stackelberg game determines the optimal quality level x. In the last stage, the retailer
decides on the consumer price as well as the order quantity, the maximization problem faced
by the retailer is as follows.
max
p,y≥0
E[pD(p, x, ε)− wy − h(y −D(p, x, ε))],
In the middle stage, the supplier anticipates the behavior of the retailer and decides on the
wholesale price given the quality level suggested by the retailer. Given the order quantity
from the retailer y(w), the maximization problem faced by the supplier in this stage is as
follows.
max
w≥0
(w − c(x))y(w), (4.3)
Finally, in the first stage, the retailer anticipates the behavior of the supplier in the
middle stage. Given p and y(w) the solutions to the last stage, and w the solution to the
middle stage, the retailer solves the following optimization problem in order to find a quality
level x that maximizes its profits.
max
x∈R
E[p(x)D(p(x), x, ε)− w(x)y(w(x))− h(y(w(x))−D(p(x), x, ε))], (4.4)
Lastly, in the integrated model, the supplier and the retailer act as a vertically integrated
supply chain. In this model, the objective is to maximize the system expected profit. The
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profit for the system has the following form.
max
p,y≥0
x∈R
E[pD(p, x, ε)− c(x)y − h(y −D(p, x, ε))]. (4.5)
The next section characterizes the solution in the absence of demand uncertainty. Then,
Section 4.5 illustrates two different contracts that allow a supplier-choice model to achieve
the profits of the integrated model.
4.4 Deterministic Demand Analysis
In this section we restrict the model to the case when demand is deterministic. Under
deterministic demand, and given the assumptions on h(y), the retailer’s optimal ordering
quantity is the demand. The next proposition, specifies the optimal quality level in the
supplier-choice model, the retailer-choice model and the integrated supply chain system.
Theorem 4.4.1. Consider a quasilinear demand D(p, x) = −bp+X(x). Assume the optimal
quality level is finite and the supplier and retailer experience positive profits. Then, the
optimal quality level under the integrated supply chain, supplier-choice and retailer-choice
the models satisfy the equation:
c′(x) =
X ′(x)
b
. (4.6)
Theorem 4.4.1 characterizes the optimal quality level for the three different models. As
it turns out, in the absence of uncertainty the three models use the same quality level. Two
observations can be made from the expression in the theorem. First, the optimal quality
level is increasing when the marginal increase in demand, X ′(x), is higher. That is, if the
potential increase in demand is higher, then the quality level used is higher. Second, if the
effect of retail price on consumer demand, b, is much larger than the effect of quality on
consumer demand, X ′(x), the optimal quality level is smaller.
As we shall see, when demand uncertainty is introduced this equivalency between the
models is broken, due to a double maginization behavior. However, in the next section we
present contracts that are able to coordinate the supply chain under general assumptions on
demand.
4.5 Coordination Contracts
In the supplier-choice model as well as the retailer-choice model, the retailer bears all the risks
of overstocking and backorders. Therefore, as we shall see in the next section, the retailer
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tends to be conservative in its order amounts, and the supplier tends to use a quality level
for the product that is not the optimal for the entire system. Thus, if we design contracts
that address these two factors, the increasing cost of quality and the retailer’s risk, one can
expect to improve the performance of the supply chain.
In this section we show two different contracts that are able to achieve the performance
of a vertically integrated supply chain. In the first contract, the retailer and the supplier
agree on a wholesale price that depends on the quality level. This wholesale price is smaller
than the production costs. In return supplier receives a given fraction of the revenue from
each unit sold by the retailer. In order to be able to coordinate the supply chain the retailer
also has to share the costs of misaligned demand with the supplier.
In our second contract, the supplier specifies a wholesale price, a buyback price and an
expedite cost. The retailer is able to reduce its risk of misaligned demand by means of the
buyback price and expedite costs offered by the supplier. The following proposition specifies
the contracts that coordinate the supply chain.
Theorem 4.5.1 (Coordination). Let φ ∈ (0, 1), the following two contracts are able to
coordinate the supply chain in order to obtain the profits of a vertically integrated supply
chain.
• Sharing: The retailer shares a portion φ of the revenues, as well as costs of misaligned
demand, with the supplier. The supplier guarantees a wholesale price of w(x) = (1 −
φ)c(x) to the retailer.
• Buyback: Supplier offers a buyback price b = −h+ − φ(p − h+) for unsold units,
expedite cost h˜− = h− − φ(h− + p) for units required, and a wholesale price w(p, x) =
c(x) + φ(p− c(x)).
Under either of these contracts, the supplier receives a fraction φ of the profits of the inte-
grated supply chain, and the retailer receives a fraction 1− φ of the profits of the integrated
supply chain.
For any given value of φ, the contracts from Theorem 4.5.1 are able to coordinate the
supply chain. However, for a contract to be implementable it must guarantee profits higher
than in the absence of such contract, and hence not every value of φ is implementable.
Notice the differences between the usual revenue sharing and buyback contracts. In the
case of the sharing contract, the wholesale price has to depend on the quality level. This is
understandable as there has to exist additional incentives for the supplier in order to provide
high quality. Observe that a high value of φ reduces the wholesale price, but at the same
time increases the percentage of revenue shared.
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In the case of buyback contracts, the wholesale price is also increasing with the quality
level. However, in this case a higher value of φ increases the wholesale price, but at the same
time increases the costs from misaligned demand that are transferred to the supplier.
Theorem 4.5.1 is valid for general demand models. In the next three sections, we consider
linear demand with the objective of characterizing solutions to all of the three models. In
the following section, we begin by analyzing the vertically integrated supply chain.
4.6 Vertically Integrated Supply Chain
In a vertically integrated supply chain, retailer and supplier maximize profits as one system.
Therefore, the profit obtained as a vertically integrated supply chain acts as an upper bound
to the sum of the retailer profits and the supplier profits under the other two models. Un-
derstanding the solution of the integrated supply chain allows us to better understand the
profits of a coordinated supply chain.
In this section, we characterize the optimal quality level in a vertically integrated supply
chain. In addition, we develop a proposition that characterizes how the optimal quality level
changes as the variance in the consumer demand increases.
The following Lemma proves useful in deriving the first order conditions to the optimiza-
tion problem faced by the vertically integrated supply chain, as well as the supplier-choice
model and the retailer-choice model.
Lemma 4.6.1 (Interchange). Consider a function h as described by our model, and ε a
continous (non atomic) random variable. Then:
d
dx
{Eε[h(x− ε)]} = E[∂h(x− ε)],
where ∂ denotes the sub differential operator.
Lemma 4.6.1 guarantees that we can interchange expectation and derivatives. This prop-
erty greatly simplifies the analysis in the general stochastic demand model. Next, we present
the main theorem of this section, characterizing the optimal quality level for a vertically in-
tegrated supply chain.
Theorem 4.6.1 (Integrated). Assume demand is linear, namely, D(p, x, ε) = A−bp+rx+ε,
denote D(p, x) the expected demand. Assume average profits are concave and finite. Then
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the optimal quality level in a vertically integrated supply chain is given by:
c′(x)
1 + 2F−1
(
h−−c(x)
h−+h+
)
D(c(x), x)
 = r
b
. (4.7)
And thus, the retailer stocking quantity is given by:
y = D(p, x) + F−1
(
h− − c(x)
h− + h+
)
.
Theorem 4.6.1 characterizes the optimal quality level x, as well as the optimal stocking
quantity y. Observe that as consumer demand variance approaches zero, we recover the
deterministic demand solution.
An interesting question to explore is how the optimal quality level is affected by increasing
variance in consumer demand. Interestingly, by means of the implicit function theorem, we
can derive an ordinary differential equation that characterizes the evolution of the quality
level as the variance increases, as presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.6.1. Consider a vertically integrated supply chain. Assume demand is linear,
namely, D(p, x, ε) = A− bp+ rx+ ε, denote D(p, x) the expected demand. Assume average
profits are concave. Then, the evolution of the optimal quality level as the variance increases
is given by the following ordinary differential equation:
x′(σ) =
∂
∂σ
F−1(h
−−c(x)
h++h− )
c′(x)
f(F−1(h
−−c(x)
h++h− ))(h
++h−)
+ F−1(h
−−c(x)
h++h− )
−bc′(x)+r
D(c(x),x)
− c′′(x)D(c(x),x)r
2c′(x)2b
(4.8)
x(0) = (c′)−1(
r
b
) (4.9)
Proof. We know the solution for deterministic demand, meaning σ = 0, this proves the
expression for x(0). We are interested in studying the effect of increasing variance on the
quality level.
Equation (4.7) guarantees that the set of optimal quality level for different values of σ
can be described as :
X = {(x, σ) ∈ [0,+∞)2|g(x, σ) = r
b
},
where g(x, σ) = c′(x)
(
1 + 2
F−1(h
−−c(x)
h−+h+ )
D(c(x),x)
)
. Observe that g is as differentiable as F−1 and
c′. By means of the analytic implicit function theorem we prove the existence of a solution
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x(σ), and moreover:
x′(σ) = −gσ(x(σ), σ)
gx(x(σ), σ)
(4.10)
Substituting the expressions in (4.10), we obtain the result.
Equation 4.8 characterizes the evolution of the optimal quality level as the variance
increases. Of course, the initial condition to the differential equation is the solution from the
deterministic demand model. Unfortunately, an analytical solution to this equation is not
easy to derive. However, differential equations allows for easy numerical implementations. In
this particular case, given the simplicity of the numerator, we can establish some analytical
properties as well.
Corollary 4.6.1. Let x0 = (c
′)−1( r
b
), the deterministic solution, and ε a symmetric distri-
bution. If c(x0) =
1
2
(h+ − h−), then x(σ) is constant for all σ.
Proof. Given the hypothesis we have,
h− − c(x0)
h− + h+
=
1
2
.
Given that the distribution is symmetric ∂
∂σ
F−1(1
2
) = 0 for all σ. Therefore, x′(σ) = 0.
concluding the result.
Corollary 4.6.1 characterizes a special type of solution. If the deterministic solution is
such that the cost of its quality level is an average between h+ and −h−, then the solution is
not affected by the variance. In other words, it is possible for the risk of misaligned demand
to be balanced by a particular value of h+ and h−. The only requirement for the existence of
this solution is for the distribution to be symmetric. Given that for this particular case we
can obtain analytical expressions for all the relevant quantities, this solution proves useful
as a first step to identify relations between parameters.
In the following sections we explore the solutions for the supplier-choice and the retailer-
choice model.
4.7 Supplier-Choice Model
In the supplier-choice model, we have two different parties each maximizing its own profit.
The supplier decides the quality level for the product and the wholesale price to the retailer.
The retailer decides on the stocking quantity and the price to the consumer. A higher quality
level comes at a greater cost to the supplier. However, quality increases expected demand
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and thus retailer’s stocking quantity, affecting supplier’s payoff. We begin by characterizing
the optimal wholesale price, consumer price and quality level used by the respective parties.
The following proposition characterizes the quality level, price to the consumer and whole-
sale price, by means of a system of equations.
Theorem 4.7.1 (Supplier-Choice). Assume linear consumer demand with an additive noise,
D(p, x, ε) = A− bp+ rx+ ε. Consider a supplier-choice setting. If the supplier is receiving
non-zero profits, then the optimal selling price p, and the optimal quality level x satisfy the
following system:
c′(x)
[
1 +
2
bf(F−1(ξ(p, x)))(h+ + h−)
]
=
r
b
(4.11)
2(D(p, x) + F−1(ξ(p, x))) = (p− 1
b
D(p, x)− c(x))(b+ 2
f(F−1(ξ(p, x)))(h+ + h−)
),
where ξ(p, x) =
h−−p+D(p,x)
b
h++h− and D(p, x) is the expected demand given p and x. Addi-
tionally, given the solution to the system, the wholesale selling price from the supplier to the
retailer is given by
w = p−D(p, x)/b.
Equation (4.11) resembles the condition from Theorem 4.6.1. However in this case, the
condition depends explicitly on the price to the customers. Thus, it’s not possible to directly
compare in general the quality level in a supplier-choice model, with the quality level in
the integrated supply chain. However, if ε is distributed uniformly over an interval, the
dependency on p in Equation (4.11) disappears and it is possible to compare the policies as
done in Jira (2013).
In order to obtain numerical solutions, it is possible to proceed as in the previous section.
Given that the quality level is now characterized in a system of equations, applying the
procedure from Proposition 4.6.1 yields a system of differential equations. The system of
differential equations characterizing the solution as demand variance increases is presented
in the next proposition.
Corollary 4.7.1. The solution to the supplier-choice model, (x, p), satisfies the following
differential equation on σ.{
α1(x, p, σ)x
′(σ) + β1(x, p, σ)p′(σ) = γ1(x, p, σ)
α2(x, p, σ)x
′(σ) + β2(x, p, σ)p′(σ) = γ2(x, p, σ)
where,
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• α1(x, p, σ) = 2c′′(x)(1 + 2bf(F−1(ξ(x,p)))(h++h−) )− 2c′(x)r f
′(F−1(ξ(x,p)))
b2(h−+h+)2f(F−1(x,p))3 .
• β1(x, p, σ) = 2c′(x)f ′(F−1(ξ(x, p))) 2b(h++h−)2f(F−1(ξ(x,p)))3
• γ1(x, p, σ) = 2c′(x)∂σf(F
−1(ξ(x,p)))+f ′(F−1(ξ(x,p)))∂σF−1(ξ(x,p))
b(h++h−)f(F−1(ξ(x,p)))2 .
• α2(x, p, σ) = 3r + 4 rb(h++h−)f(F−1(ξ(x,p))) + c′(x)(b+ 2(h++h−)f(F−1(ξ(x,p))) )
+ 2(p−D(p, x)/b− c(x)) rf ′(F−1(ξ(x,p)))b(h++h−)2f(F−1(ξ(x,p)))3 .
• β2(x, p, σ) = −4b− 8(h++h−)f(F−1(ξ(x,p))) − 4(p−D(p, x)/b− c(x)) f
′(F−1(ξ(x,p)))
(h++h−)2f(F−1(ξ(x,p)))3 .
• γ2(x, p, σ) = −2∂σF−1(ξ(x, p))− 2(p−D(p, x)/b− c(x))∂σf(F
−1(ξ(x,p)))+f ′(F−1(ξ(x,p)))∂σF−1(ξ(x,p))
(h++h−)f(F−1(ξ(x,p)))2 .
The system of differential equations in Corollary 4.7.1, is significantly more complex then
the system presented in Corollary 4.6.1. The added complexity is a result of not being able to
separate consumer price and quality level in the optimality conditions. However, numerical
solutions can be derived from the system of equations by means of approximations of the
derivatives.
In order to obtain numerical intuition for the relations between the three models pre-
sented, we require to determine a similar system of equations for the retailer-choice model.
4.8 Retailer Choice Setting
In the retailer-choice model we consider a retailer to be influential enough to be able to
suggest a quality level to the supplier. In this setting, the retailer chooses the price to
the consumer, stocking quantity and quality level to be used by the supplier. The supplier
chooses the wholesale price. The retailer has incentives to suggest higher quality level in order
to increase demand. However, suggesting higher quality levels leads to higher wholesale price
from the supplier.
Similar to the previous sections, the following proposition characterizes the wholesale
price, quality level and stocking quantity by means of a system of equations.
Theorem 4.8.1 (Retailer-Choice). Assume a linear demand with an additive noise, D(p, x) =
A−bp+rx+ε. Consider a retailer-choice setting. If the supplier is receiving non-zero profits
then the optimal selling price p, and the optimal quality level x, satisfy the following system:{
c′(x)[1 + 2
bf(F−1(ξ(p,x)))(h++h−) ] =
r
b
(1− 2 D(p.x)
D(p,x)+F−1(ξ(p,x))(
F−1(ξ(p.x))
D(p,x)
− 2
bf(F−1(ξ(p,x)))(h++h−)
−(p−D(p, x)/b− c(x)) f
′(F−1(ξ(p, x)))
bf(F−1(ξ(p, x)))3(h+ + h−)2
)) (4.12)
2(D(p, x) + F−1(ξ(p, x))) = (p− 1
b
D(p, x)− c(x))(b+ 2
f(F−1(ξ(p, x)))(h+ + h−)
),
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where ξ(p, x) =
h−−p+D(p,x)
b
h++h− . Additionally, given the solution to the system, the wholesale
price from the supplier to the retailer is given by
w = p−D(p, x)/b.
Observe that the system is similar to Theorem 4.7.1. In fact, the only difference is in the
right hand side of Equation (4.12). However, as in Theorem 4.7.1, the explicit dependency
on price in Equation (4.12) hinder us from comparing the conditions from Theorem 4.7.1
and 4.8.1 analytically for a general distribution of customer demand. In the particular
case when ε is distributed uniformly over an interval, it is possible to extract analytical
solutions and compare the three models analytically, see Jira (2013). Additionally, as in the
previous section, it is possible to derive a system of differential equations that characterizes
the evolution of the optimal quality level and price to the consumer as the variance increases.
The system of differential equations is remitted to the appendix.
4.9 Numerical Example
Figures 4-1–4-2 illustrate the power of the system of differential equations through numerical
examples, see details in Appendix 4.C. The x-coordinate always represents the standard
deviation σ. That is, in this numerical example for x = 0, we have the deterministic solution.
In Figure 4-1 in the top right corner, we observe the difference between the expected
revenue of the retailer under a retailer-choice model (presented in green), and a supplier-
choice model (presented in blue). Of course, the retailer’s profit is always higher in a retailer-
choice model. Interestingly, the profit of the retailer initially increases with small values of the
variance, and proceeds to decrease after a certain point. There are many factors interacting
in the model, however as it can be seen from the plot in the top left corner the increase in
profits has to be connected to the increase in expected demand. The plot in the bottom left
corner shows the profits for the supplier. Obviously, the supplier profit is higher under a
supplier-choice model. Finally, it can be seen from the plot in the bottom right corner that
the benefits of coordinating the supply chain are of the order of 28% in this example.
In Figure 4-2, it can be seen that the greatest difference between the models is in the
quality level. In the retailer-choice model, the retailer tends to demand a higher level of
quality than that of the benchmark. On the other hand, in the supplier-choice model, the
supplier tends to use a quality level that is lower than the benchmark. As seen in Section
4.5, the lack of incentive to invest in quality for the supplier can be balanced by having a
wholesale price depending on the quality of the product.
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Figure 4-1: Numerical performance of the policies, SC=supplier-choice, RC= retailer-choice,
B=Integrated supply chain. E[D] = Expected Demand, Q=order quantity.
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Figure 4-2: Numerical performance of the policies, SC=supplier-choice, RC= retailer-choice,
B=Integrated supply chain. E[D] = Expected Demand, Q=order quantity.
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Interestingly, the retailer demanding a higher quality level than the supplier is not always
the case. When the difference between the expediting costs and the unit holding cost is too
high, it is possible to reverse the quality preference in the model, that is, a retailer would
desire less quality than what the supplier would normally choose. This unusual phenomenon
is a result of the high risk of misaligned demand faced by the retailer. When the risk is too
high, the benefits of additional consumer demand for the retailer can be surpassed by the
increased costs of misaligned demand.
4.10 Conclusions
Whether it is lower carbon emissions, greater nutritional value, or luxury add ons, there is an
opportunity to increase consumer demand by increasing the quality of a product. Of course,
an increase in quality comes at a higher cost to the supplier. However, there is potential for
increasing profits for both parties, the supplier and the retailer.
In this chapter, we investigated the impact quality investment decisions have on the
supply chain. We analyzed three different models, (i) a supplier-choice model, where the
supplier is in charge of deciding the optimal product quality level, (ii) a retailer-choice
model, where a retailer demands a quality level from the supplier, and (iii) an integrated
supply chain, where supplier and retailer act as a vertically integrated firm.
Under a deterministic demand model, we found that the optimal quality level in all three
models is the same. However, when demand uncertainty is introduced a difference in the
optimal quality level in each model is observed.
For the supplier- and retailer-choice model we characterized the conditions for optimal
quality level and price to the consumer. Through a system of differential equations we derived
the changes in quality level and price to the consumer as the variance in consumer demand
increases. The large number of parameters defining the problem, as well as the interaction
among these, are an obstacle to obtaining general analytical results that are valid for any
given range of parameters. Nonetheless, these systems of differential equations provide a basis
for algorithms to obtain numerical solutions efficiently. In most of the examples studied, the
quality level demanded by the retailer in the retailer-choice model was higher than the quality
level decided by the supplier in a supplier-choice model. However, there were exceptions when
the costs associated to misaligned demand (expediting/ holding costs) where much higher
than the price to the consumer.
The profits in an integrated supply chain were significantly higher than the profits in
either the supplier- or retailer-choice model. There are two factors contributing to this dif-
ference. First, there is the added benefit from eliminating the double marginization induced
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by the wholesale contract. Second, there is the added benefit of choosing a quality level
that is optimal for the entire supply chain. Depending on the sensitivity of demand to the
quality level, and the relation between supplier cost and quality, this second effect can be
very significant.
A final result to emphasize is the extension of buyback contracts and revenue sharing
contracts to coordinate the supply chain in our model. There are two elements that are key
in these contracts. The first element is reducing risks of misaligned demand to the retailer.
This is a feature present in many contracts that coordinate the supply chain. The second
element is particular to our model, and is to allow the wholesale price to be proportional
to the supplier cost. This added feature effectively provides incentives to the supplier for
higher investment in quality.
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4.A Proofs
4.A.1 Theorem 4.4.1
Proof. The positive profits assumption guarantees that the optimization problems, (4.1)-
(4.5), have interior optimal solutions.
Given that demand is deterministic, and the constraints in h+ and h−, the optimal
purchase amount for the retailer is y = D(p, x).
• The optimal technology level in the vertically integrated supply chain is given by,
max
p≥0
x∈R
(p− c(x))D(p, x).
Given the positivity of costs, the boundary constrain p = 0, yields negative profit.
Therefore, given that the optimal technology level is finite, the solution lies in the
interior and satisfies the following conditions:
D(p, x)− (p− c(x))b = 0
−c′(x)D(p, x) + (p− c(x))X ′(x) = 0
By multiplying the first equation by X
′(x)
b
, and adding the conditions, we obtain (4.6).
• In the supplier choice model, by finding the optimal conditions for p in (4.1), the
following relation for the wholesale price w can be established,
w = p− D(p, x)
b
. (4.13)
Therefore, we can pose the problem faced by the supplier, (4.2), in terms of p and x,
max
p≥D(p,x)
b
x∈R
(p− D(p, x)
b
− c(x))D(p, x).
The optimal interior conditions for this problem are:
2D(p, x)− (p− D(p, x)
b
− c(x))b = 0 (4.14)
−c′(x)D(p, x) + (p− D(p, x)
b
− c(x))X ′(x) = 0 (4.15)
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By multiplying the first equation by X
′(x)
b
, this yields the condition for the optimal
level of x.
• In the retailer choice model, solving the third stage problem yields the condition (4.13).
The second stage problem yields the condition (4.14). Finally, by means of (4.13) and
using p(x) implicitly, we write the last stage problem as,
max
x
−D(p(x), x)
b
.
Hence, we obtain the condition: X ′(x) = bp′(x). By means of the implicit function
theorem, we can differentiate (4.14) implicitly. By doing this, we obtain,
(p′(x)− 1
b
(bp′(x)−X ′(x))− c′(x))D(p(x), x) + (2 + p(x)− 1
b
D(p(x), x)− c(x))(−bp′(x) +X ′(x)) = 0
Finally, using that X ′(x) = bp′(x), we obtain the condition for the optimal level of
x.
4.A.2 Theorem 4.5.1
Proof. We show that the maximization problem faced by the retailer and supplier is the
same maximization problem as the vertically integrated supply chain.
• Sharing: Under this contract the retailer’s decision problem, (4.1), becomes:
max
p,y≥0
E[pD(p, x, ε)− (1−φ)c(x)y−h(y−D(p, x, ε))−φpD(p, x, ε)+φh(y−D(p, x, ε))],
or equivalently,
max
p,y≥0
(1− φ)E[pD(p, x, ε)− c(x)y − h(y −D(p, x, ε))].
Therefore, given x, the retailer chooses the price and order quantity of the vertically
integrated supply chain. The problem faced by the supplier in this contract is:
max
x∈R
(−φc(x))y(x) + φE[p(x)D(p(x), x, ε)− h(y(x)−D(p(x), x, ε))],
or equivalently,
max
x∈R
φE[p(x)D(p(x), x, ε)− c(x)y(x)− h(y(x)−D(p(x), x, ε))].
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And hence the supplier choose the technological level x of the vertically integrated
supply chain.
• Buyback Given the new buyback and expedite costs, the retailer problem is:
max
p,y≥0
E[pD(p, x, ε)−(c(x)+φ(p−c(x))y+bmax{0, y−D(p, x, ε)}−h˜−max{0, D(p, x, ε)−y}],
Given the definitions in the contract, the problem can be rewritten into,
max
p,y≥0
(1− φ)E[pD(p, x, ε)− c(x)y − h(y −D(p, x, ε))],
Similarly, the profit for the supplier under this contract is:
max
x∈R
φ(p(x)−c(x))y(x)−bmax{0, y(x)−D(p(x), x, ε)}−h˜−max{0, D(p(x), x, ε)−y(x)},
which, given the definitions in the statement, can be rewritten into,
max
x∈R
φE[p(x)D(p(x), x, ε)− c(x)y(x)− h(y(x)−D(p(x), x, ε))].
Therefore, implementing this contract yields the same result as a vertically integrated
supply chain.
4.A.3 Lemma 4.6.1
Proof. A quick calculation yields:
∂h(x) =
{
h+ if x > 0
h− if x ≤ 0
Note that the value at zero for ∂h is irrelevant as there is an expected value of a continuous
random variable, and hence the value at a specific point can be ignored.
We begin by using the definition of derivative:
d
dx
{Eε[h(x−ε)]} = lim
δ→0
1
δ
(Eε[h(x+δ−ε)]−Eε[h(x−ε)]) = lim
δ→0
1
δ
(Eε[h(x+δ−ε)−h(x−ε)])
Let’s consider the case δ ↘ 0, meaning δ positive. The case for negative is symmetric.
Once we show that both limits (left and right) exists and are the same, we have that the
derivative exists. For δ > 0, we have:
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h(x+ δ − ε)− h(x− ε) =

h+δ if ε ≤ x
(h+ + h−)(x− ε) + h+δ if x < ε ≤ x+ δ
h−δ if ε > x+ δ
Hence:
Eε[h(x+ δ − ε)− h(x− ε)]) = h+δP(ε ≤ x) + h−δP(ε > x+ δ)
+ h+δP(x < ε ≤ x+ δ) + (h+ + h−)E[(x− ε)1(x,x+δ](ε)]
Observe that as δ ↘ 0, monotone convergence theorem guarantees P(ε > x+δ)↗ P(ε >
x), and hence the first two terms converge to E[∂h(x− ε)] . It remains to see that the other
terms converge to zero.
• Given that h+P(x < ε ≤ x+δ) ≤ h+, by means of the dominated convergence theorem
we prove that h+P(x < ε ≤ x+ δ)→ P(x = ε) = 0.
• Finally, observe that:
−δP(x < ε ≤ x+ δ) ≤ E[(x− ε)1(x,x+δ](ε)] ≤ 0
Therefore, we know that 1
δ
E[(x − ε)1(x,x+δ](ε)] → 0, since it’s bounded by two limits
that go to zero.
4.A.4 Proposition 4.6.1
Proof. The optimization problem in this setting is:
max
p,y≥0
x∈R
pD(p, x)− c(x)y −E[h(y −D(p, x)− ε)]
Given that a price, p = 0 no revenue is collected, it is not going to be optimal. Increasing
price provides revenue, and reduces demand, therefore less cost from unsatisfied demand.
An order quantity, y = 0 can be verified to not be optimal given that c(x) < h−, i.e. as long
as expedite cost is greater than production cost we won’t expedite everything. Finally, given
the restriction of finite profits, x has to be finite.
Given that average profits are concave by hypothesis, and g(z) = E[h(z−ε)] is convex in
ε (see Simchi-Levi et al. (2005)), we have that the objective function is concave. Therefore,
the optimal is in the interior, first order conditions are sufficient.
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The first order conditions are:
y : −c(x)− ∂
∂y
E[h(y −D(p, x)− ε)] = 0.
p : −pb+D(p, x)− ∂
∂p
E[h(y −D(p, x)− ε)] = 0.
x : pr − c′(x)y − ∂
∂x
E[h(y −D(p, x)− ε)] = 0.
Lemma 4.6.1, states that we can interchange derivative and expectation, therefore:
y : −c(x) = E[∂h(y −D(p, x)− ε)] (4.16)
p : −pb+D(p, x) + c(x)b = 0 (4.17)
x : pr − c′(x)y − c(x)r = 0 (4.18)
By using the definition of ∂h in (4.16), the following expression for the order quantity
can be derived:
y = D(p, x) + F−1
(
h− − c(x)
h− + h+
)
Given equation (4.17) and that demand is linear, by adding and subtracting D(c(x), x), the
following identity can be derived:
2D(p, x) = D(c(x), x).
Now multiplying (4.17) by − r
b
and subtracting (4.18) we find:
−D(p, x)r
b
+ c′(x)
[
D(p, x) + F−1
(
h− − c(x)
h− + h+
)]
= 0
Thus concluding the theorem.
4.A.5 Theorem 4.7.1
Proof. Consider the supplier choice model. To find w, p, x and y, we start by solving the
problem the retailer faces.
max
p,y≥0
pD(p, x)− wy −E[h(y −D(p, x)− ε)]
Similar to Theorem 4.6.1, boundary conditions cannot be optimal. Given that pD(p, x)
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is concave in p, then an optimal solution satisfies the following first order conditions.
y : −w − ∂
∂y
[E[h(y −D(p, x)− ε)]] = 0.
p : pDp +D(p, x)− ∂
∂p
[E[h(y −D(p, x)− ε)]] = 0.
In this situation we can apply Lemma 4.6.1 to simplify the first order conditions:
y : −w = E[∂h(y −D(p, x)− ε)]
p : −pb+D(p, x) + wb = 0
Therefore we can characterize y in terms of w, and with the second equation, characterize
w in terms of p:
y(p) = F−1
(
h− − w(p)
h+ + h−
)
+D(p, x) (4.19)
w(p) = p− 1
b
D(p, x) (4.20)
Given these expressions we can formulate the problem faced by the retailer as:
max
p≥D(p,x)/b
x∈R
(w(p)− c(x))y(p) = max
p≥D(p,x)/b
x∈R
(p− 1
b
D(p, x)− c(x))(D(p, x) + F−1(ξ(p, x))).
Given the hypothesis of non-zero profits, the solution has to be in the interior. An interior
solution satisfies:
p : 2(D(p, x) + F−1(ξ(p, x))) = (p− 1
b
D(p, x)− c(x))(b+ 2
f(F−1(ξ(p, x)))(h+ + h−)
)
x : (− rb − c′(x))(D(p, x) + F−1(ξ(p, x))) = (p−
1
b
D(p, x)− c(x))(−r + r
Dpf(F−1(ξ(p, x)))(h+ + h−)
)
Given the first equation, we can replace (D(p, x) + F−1(ξ(p, x))) in the second equation to
find,
(w(p)− c(x))
(
1
2
(−r
b
− c′(x))
(
b+
2
f(F−1(ξ(p, x)))(h+ + h−)
)
+ r +
r
bf(F−1(ξ(p, x)))(h+ + h−)
)
= 0
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Given the supplier is receiving positive profits, we have,
1
2
(−r
b
− c′(x))
(
b+
2
f(F−1(ξ(p, x)))(h+ + h−)
)
+ r +
r
bf(F−1(ξ(p, x)))(h+ + h−)
= 0
Rearranging the terms we find:
c′(x)
[
1 +
2
bf(F−1(ξ(p, x)))(h+ + h−)
]
=
r
b
Therefore proving the statement.
4.A.6 Proposition 4.8.1
Proof. To solve this setting we start with the latest stage, the retailer solves,
max
p,y≥0
pD(p, x)− wy −E[h(y −D(p, x)− ε)]
As we can see the problem is exactly the same as in the supplier choice setting, and therefore
the first order conditions are the same:
y(p) = F−1
(
h− − w(p)
h+ + h−
)
+D(p, x)
w(p) = p− 1
b
D(p, x)
Next the supplier determines the sell price w. As done in the supplier choice problem,
we formulate the optimization problem in terms of p,
max
w(p)≥0
(w(p)− c(x))y(p) = max
p≥D(p,x)/b
(p− 1
b
D(p, x)− c(x))(D(p, x) + F−1(ξ(p, x))).
Given the non-zero profits assumption, the solution has to be an interior solution. Therefore,
the first order condition is:
2(D(p, x) + F−1(ξ(p, x))) = (p− 1
b
D(p, x)− c(x))(b+ 2
f(F−1(ξ(p, x)))(h+ + h−)
). (4.21)
This condition is the same as in the supplier choice setting, and characterizes p(x).
For the rest of the analysis we work with p(x) as an implicit variable.
The last stage to consider is the decision of x by the retailer. This decision comes from
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the optimization problem:
max
x
p(x)D(p(x), x)− w(p(x))y(p(x))−E[h(F−1(ξ(p(x), x))− ε)]. (4.22)
By means of implicit derivation, we can establish the following identities:
d
dx
D(p(x), x) = −bp′(x) + r
d
dx
ξ(p(x), x) =
−2p′(x) + r
b
h+ + h−
From the optimal conditions of the retailer’s last stage we know w(p(x)) = E[δh(y(p(x))−
D(p(x), x)− ε)]. Using this identities we can rewrite the first order condition of (4.22) into :
p′(x) =
r
b
[1− F
−1(ξ(p(x), x))
2(F−1(ξ(p(x), x)) +D(p(x), x))
]. (4.23)
In order to find an expression similar to the previous section, we consider equation (4.21),
which is valid for the different values that x may take, and differentiate the equality with
respect to x. This yields the following expression,
−bc′(x)
(
1 +
2
bf(F−1(ξ(p(x), x)))(h+ + h−)
)
= −4bp′(x) + 3r − 4 2p
′(x)b− r
bf(F−1(ξ(p(x), x))(h+ + h−)
+(w(p(x))− c(x)) 2(−2p
′(x)b+ r)f ′(F−1(ξ(p, x))
bf(F−1(ξ(p(x), x)))3(h+ + h−)2
By means of equation (4.23), we replace p′(x) and divide by −b, yielding the following
expression expressed in functional form:
c′(x)(1 +
2
b(h+ + h−)f ◦ F−1 ◦ ξ ) =
r
b
− 2r
b
F−1 ◦ ξ
(D + F−1 ◦ ξ) +
2r
b2
D
(D + F−1 ◦ ξ)
2
(h+ + h−)f ◦ F−1 ◦ ξ
+ (p−D/b− c)2r
b2
D
D + F−1 ◦ ξ
f ′ ◦ F−1 ◦ ξ
(f ◦ F−1 ◦ ξ)3(h+ + h−)2
Therefore, concluding the result.
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4.B System of differential equations Retailer Choice
Model
By using the implicit function theorem in the system of equations in Theorem 4.8.1. We
find a system of equations,{
α2(x, p, σ)x
′(σ) + β2(x, p, σ)p′(σ) = γ2(x, p, σ)
α3(x, p, σ)x
′(σ) + β3(x, p, σ)p′(σ) = γ3(x, p, σ)
where α2, β2 and γ2, are the same as in Corollary 4.7.1, as the equation that yield them is
the same. To identify the remaining terms we separate them in four.
It can be shown that α3 = α31 − α32 − α33 − α34, β3 = β31 − β32 − β33 − β34 and
γ3 = −γ31 + γ32 + γ33 + γ34, where,
α31 = c
′′
(
1 + 2b(h++h−)f◦F−1◦ξ
)
− 2rc′ f ′◦F−1◦ξb2(h++h−)2f◦F−1◦ξ3
α32 = −2 r2b D(D+F−1◦ξ)2
(
1
b(h++h−)f◦F−1◦ξ − F
−1◦ξ
D
)
α33 = 4
r2
b2
D
(D+F−1◦ξ)
1
(D+F−1◦ξ) (
F−1◦ξ
D − 1b(h++h−)f◦F−1◦ξ )−
f′◦F−1◦ξ
(h++h−)(f◦F−1◦ξ)2
(h++h−)f◦F−1◦ξ
aux =
((
f ′′◦F−1◦ξ
f ′◦F−1◦ξ − 3 (f
′◦F−1◦ξ)
(f◦F−1◦ξ)
)
+ (f◦F
−1◦ξ)
(D+F−1◦ξ)
(
b(h+ + h−)F
−1◦ξ
D − 1f◦F−1◦ξ
))
aux2 = −( rb + c′)(f ◦ F−1 ◦ ξ) + r(p−D/b−c)b(h++h−) aux
α34 =
D
(D+F−1◦ξ)
2r
b2(h++h−)2
f ′◦F−1◦ξ
(f◦F−1◦ξ)4 aux2
β31 = 4c
′ f ′◦F−1◦ξ
b(h++h−)2(f◦F−1◦ξ)3
β32 = 2r
D
(D+F−1◦ξ)2
(
2
b(h++h−)f◦F−1◦ξ − F
−1◦ξ
D
)
β33 = −4 rb DD+F−1◦ξ
1
D+F−1◦ξ
(
F−1◦ξ
D − 2b(h++h−)f◦F−1◦ξ
)
−2 f′◦F−1◦ξ
b(h++h−)(f◦F−1◦ξ)2
(h++h−)f◦F−1◦ξ
aux = 2f
′◦F−1◦ξ
(f◦F−1◦ξ)3 − (p−D/b−c)(h++h−) aux2
aux2 = (2(
f ′′◦F−1◦ξ
(f◦F−1◦ξ)4 − 3 (f
′◦F−1◦ξ)2
(f◦F−1◦ξ)5 ) +
f ′◦F−1◦ξ
(f◦F−1◦ξ)3
(F
−1◦ξ
D b(h
++h−)− 2
f◦F−1◦ξ )
(D+F−1◦ξ) )
β34 = 2
r
b2(h++h−)2
D
(D+F−1◦ξ)aux
γ31 =
2
h++h− c
′ (∂σf)◦F−1◦ξ+(f ′◦F−1◦ξ)((∂σF−1)◦ξ)
(−b)(f◦F−1◦ξ)2
γ32 = −2 rb (∂σF−1) ◦ ξ D(D+F−1◦ξ)2
γ33 = −4 rb2 D(D+F−1◦ξ)
(∂σF
−1)◦ξ
D+F−1◦ξ +
(∂σf)◦F−1◦ξ
f◦F−1◦ξ +f
′◦F−1◦ξ (∂σF−1)◦ξ
f◦F−1◦ξ
(h++h−)f◦F−1◦ξ
aux1 =
(∂σf
′)◦F−1◦ξ
(f◦F−1◦ξ)3 − 3 (f
′◦F−1◦ξ)
(f◦F−1◦ξ)4 ((∂σf) ◦ F−1 ◦ ξ)
aux2 = ((∂σF
−1) ◦ ξ)( (f ′′◦F−1◦ξ)(f◦F−1◦ξ)3 − 3 (f
′◦F−1◦ξ)2
(f◦F−1◦ξ)4 )
aux3 = (f
′ ◦ F−1 ◦ ξ) ((∂σF−1)◦ξ)((D+F−1◦ξ)∗(f◦F−1◦ξ3)
aux4 = aux1 + aux2 − aux3
γ34 =
2r
b2(h++h−)2 (p−D/b− c) DD+F−1◦ξaux4
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4.C Parameters Figures 4-1–4-2
The following parameters were used in the creation of Figures 4-1–4-2.
• Demand : D(p, x, ε) = 100− 2p+ 10x+ ε, ε N(0, σ2).
• Cost : c(x) = 20 + 20x2.
• Misaligned demand costs: h− = 40, h+ = 10.
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Chapter 5
Concluding Remarks
In this thesis we analyzed three different problems associated with sustainability. In Chapter
2, we studied optimal bidding strategies in a wholesale electricity market. This market works
as an auction where producers bid a price they are willing to sell their capacity, and demand is
allocated to producers based on their bid. Even though the market operates as an auction, in
the analysis we did not use the classic auction framework. In most of the auction literature,
the main assumption involves symmetric players with valuations for items drawn from a
common distribution. In the case of the wholesale electricity market, this would translate to
assuming producers’ cost to be drawn from a common distribution. This assumption, while
suitable for auctions where players have little information about each other, e.g. antiques
auctions, is not appropriate for the wholesale electricity market where, (i) different players
have different technologies, (ii) information about players technology is accessible to all
players, and (iii) players are not likely to switch technology. For these reasons we model the
wholesale electricity market as an asymmetric game with public information. Surprisingly,
we find that with asymmetry of producer’s costs, there exists a pure strategy equilibrium
which could not be obtained in a symmetric model.
In Chapter 3, the problem of comparing carbon tax with quota based policies was studied,
taking into account the perspective of consumers, producers and central planner. We show
that in a deterministic setting there is no differences between the two policies, however, these
two policies differ considerably under stochastic demand. There are two results that deserve
special attention. One is that it is possible for producers with clean technology to offset
the additional cost of a tax, and in fact, obtain higher profits with an increasing tax value.
The intuition behind this result is that the introduction of a carbon tax policy increases
consumer prices, and if the producer’s technology is much cleaner than the technology of
the competition, the increase in cost would be offset by the increase in price. It is important
to note that this result is unattainable in a symmetric producers model, as in such model it
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can be proved that producers receive decreasing profits with higher tax values. Second, our
analysis shows that the producer with the highest amount of emissions per unit produced is
always better of in a tax policy as opposed to a cap policy. However, this is not always true
for all producers, as the producer with the cleanest technology may receive higher profits
under a cap policy. As in the previous result, this observation is only possible to obtain in
an asymmetric producers model. Indeed, in a symmetric producer model, all producers are
better off under a tax policy.
Chapter 4 follows models more consistent with the supply chain management literature.
In this chapter, we analyzed a sequential two-stage supply chain. In the model, demand is
increasing in a quality measures such as emissions level, nutritional values or luxury features,
which can be increased at higher cost to the supplier. Typically, the supplier chooses the
quality level to apply, however, in some cases retailers impose a quality requirement on
the supplier. When comparing these two models, we found there was no difference for the
supply chain performance under deterministic demand. However, these models differ under
stochastic demand.
Obviously, in both of these environments supply chain profit is lower than under an
integrated model. We derived contracts capable of coordinating the supply chain, implying
the contracts are able to achieve the profits and quality level of a vertically integrated supply
chain. The contracts found resembled buyback and revenue sharing contracts, but include a
dependency on the quality level. In the performance analysis, the implicit function theorem
was used in a non traditional way as means for characterizing the evolution of the quality
parameter when the variance on the demand increases. This characterization allowed for
simple algorithms that compute profits, quality level, consumer price, etc. This approach
can be useful in many models where an analytical solution is hard to compute, e.g. news
vendor model with pricing.
This thesis would be incomplete if we don’t point out other ways to model and compare
cap-and-trade and carbon tax. For example, consider a deterministic demand model where
suppliers have linear production cost and linear technology. Suppliers bid a supply function,
and there is a central planner that allocates demand at minimum cost to consumers. Assume
that there is a fixed number of permits that are distributed among the players, and the players
are engaged in a market mechanism that allows them to trade with each other. For a given
electricity market price and demand allocation, cooperative game theory can be applied to
determine the resulting price of permits and the number of permits purchased/sold by each
player. However, finding the optimal bidding strategies for the suppliers requires solving a
non convex optimization problem.
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